DOB Frequently Asked Questions

This section addresses questions related to the earthquake experienced on April 5, 2024.

Spent Fuel Storage

Was the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) inspected to confirm no movement or tipping occurred?
According to Holtec, the ISFSI pad was the first place that operators inspected.  Holtec found no signs of cracks or any indications that anything shifted on the ISFSI following the earthquake.

What type of fill is used under the ISFSI?
According to Holtec, the only material brought in for the construction of the ISFSI pads (other than the rebar and concrete) was 100% virgin granite. Further, Holtec indicated no organic fill was used under the pad.

What are the seismic ratings of dry casks?
According to Holtec, spent fuel dry casks are designed based on peak accelerations of 0.15g horizontal and 0.10g vertical.  Additionally, Holtec indicated that the Indian Point License requires the site to withstand a category VII (7) earthquake on the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale.

Data obtained from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) website indicated that the April 5, 2024 earthquake registered a 3.6 on the MMI scale at Indian Point.

In addition to meeting the MMI requirements stated above, the dry casks at Indian Point are designed and tested to additional rigorous standards. According to the DOB’s independent technical expert Dave Lochbaum, “dry casks are designed and analyzed for numerous postulated challenges including explosions, fires, and tip-overs. Each cask design is subjected to tests to demonstrate that the computer models are accurate. As documented in the [2022] Final Safety Analysis Report¹ for the Hi-Storm 100 casks like those used at Indian Point, the casks were subjected to, and withstood, tip-over, a fire accident, tornadoes, floods, and explosions, among a number of other accident scenarios.”

¹Holtec International Final Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System, April 15, 2022.

Spent Fuel Pools

Were the spent fuel pools and other infrastructure inspected to confirm no cracks or leaks?
Holtec provided that the post-earthquake inspections identified no cracks or leaks. The design of the plant is such that if there were any spent fuel pool leaks, the leakage would go to sumps and would be noticed. Holtec confirmed no known leaks of the spent fuel pools on site.

Pipelines

Were the pipelines in the immediate vicinity of Indian Point inspected to confirm no damage occurred on the lines?
Pipeline owner and operator Enbridge physically observed the pipelines within the vicinity of Indian Point and performed a leakage survey with leak detection equipment. In addition, their gas control unit closely monitored all pressure readings on their systems to flag any anomalies, such as pressure loss, excess or unexpected flow. No leaks were found and no impacts to the pipeline were observed.

Enbridge noted that the type of acceleration experienced during the April 5, 2024 earthquake was not at a level that would cause transient or permanent ground deformation that may impact pipelines.

What are the seismic ratings of the interstate natural gas pipelines in the immediate vicinity of Indian Point?
According to Enbridge: “Natural gas transmission pipelines are not constructed to specific maximum earthquake size, but to the specific conditions and risks that the pipeline may be exposed to at a given location.

The federal pipeline safety regulations contain a number of design requirements and operations & maintenance requirements on the part of the operator to prevent and mitigate risks associated with earthquakes and soil movement.  Specifically:

• The design of a new pipeline, including the AIM pipeline, are required to comply with 49 CFR Part 192.103, which requires that the pipeline have sufficient wall thickness to withstand anticipated external pressures and loads. To comply with the regulation, the design of new pipelines, including repairs or replacement, must consider the load that may be imposed by geological forces.
• 49 CFR Part 192.159 “Flexibility” and 49 CFR Part 192.161 “Supports and anchors” requires underground pipeline to be installed with a certain amount of flexibility and underground pipelines that are connected to a relatively unyielding line or other fixed object must have enough flexibility to provide for possible movement.
• 49 CFR Part 192.317(a) requires that the operator must take all practicable steps to protect each transmission line or main from washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, or other hazards that may cause the pipeline to move or to sustain abnormal loads.
• 49 CFR Part 192.613(c) requires that, following an extreme weather event or natural disaster that has the likelihood of damage to pipeline facilities by the scouring or movement of the soil surrounding the pipeline or movement of the pipeline, such as an earthquake in the area of the pipeline, an operator must inspect all potentially affected onshore transmission pipeline facilities to detect conditions that could adversely affect the safe operation of that pipeline.
• 49 CFR Part 192.705 requires operators of gas transmission lines, and applicable gas gathering lines, to have a patrol program to observe surface conditions on and adjacent to the pipeline right-of-way for indications of leaks, construction activity, and other factors affecting safety and operation.

In addition, Enbridge has a number of additional measures to mitigate risks to the pipeline from earthquakes and soil movement:

• Enbridge receives real-time monitoring data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and notifications of earth movement events near its pipelines. After the earthquake on 4/5/24, Enbridge confirmed that it had received alarms notifying it of the event immediately.
• Enbridge performs patrols far more frequently than the minimum requirements listed in 49 CFR Part 192.705. 
• When Enbridge runs inline inspection tools on its pipeline, the tools are include an internal measurement unit (IMU) device, which reports the strain on the pipeline.  The IMU data is reviewed by Enbridge for any bends or movement on the pipeline that could cause undue stresses on the pipeline.

Elevations

Mean sea levels (MSL) at Indian Point

In addition to the information provided below, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) maintains a webpage addressing frequently asked questions related to Indian Point effluent releases. (external site)

Disposal Methods

Does the amount of radiation decline the longer the water stays in its spent fuel pool tanks? Fukushima’s tritium has basically hit its first half-life.
Yes, the longer the water is stored in spent fuel pools and storage tanks, the less radioactive it will be.  While this reduction in radioactivity is beneficial, there are several downsides to storing large amounts of radioactive water onsite during decommissioning.  According to Dave Lochbaum, while it is true that radiation levels of tritium decrease over time and that the tritium at Fukushima has undergone about one half-life of decay since the multi-unit severe accident that began on March 11, 2011, Fukushima's tanks leaked within 2.5 years of the accident. According to Mr. Lochbaum, even if leaks did not occur, tritiated water will evaporate regardless of containment strategy and is vented from storage tanks into the atmosphere. Additionally, this leakage and evaporation from Fukushima was not diluted with clean water flow, which occurs when treated water is discharged into the Hudson River. Storing treated water onsite for 12, 24, 36, or more years before discharging could result in lower amounts of tritium reaching the river, but presents risks that must be better understood, including: (1) risks of leaks from tanks, (2) releases of tritium via vents to the atmosphere, (3) delays to safe decommissioning of the site, and (4) additional expenses that draw down the trust fund dedicated for the purpose of thoroughly and completely decommissioning Indian Point. Further, the levels that were historically discharged at Indian Point have been at small fractions of the legal limits, and have been well below drinking water standards at the point of discharge. While some may contend that any amount of tritium is unsafe, a half-life only diminishes, but does not eliminate, the presence of tritium.

Why are water discharges to the Hudson part of operations during decommissioning?
Even though Indian Point no longer produces power, it continues to have discharges to waters of the State. While many sources of wastewater have ceased, or have been reduced, several continue to discharge, including but not limited to the house service boiler and non-contact cooling water, floor drains, and stormwater. The federal NRC licenses provides authorization for Holtec to continue to release effluent containing radionuclides subject to regulatory limits, a state SPDES permit will be required for non-radiological discharges until all discharges from the facility permanently cease.  
 

We learned that the Fukushima tanks leaked considerably. Is that going on or were the tanks fortified? In other words, can leakage be stopped?
According to Dave Lochbaum, at least some of the tanks at Fukushima were surrounded by berms a few inches tall so that leaked water would pool. Nevertheless, leaked water got into the ground, and is traveling underground under the Fukushima site towards the ocean. These unplanned discharges are not diluted with clean water, and in some cases have not been sufficiently treated/filtered to remove other radionuclides.

Is it possible to filter water in the spent fuel pools, leaving tritiated water in the pools to decay?  Could storage of tritiated water on site impact the host community?
According to Dave Lochbaum, water can be filtered to remove virtually all its radioactivity, except for tritium. But tritiated water will evaporate. In the late 1990s, the spent fuel pool at Brookhaven National Lab on Long Island was discovered to have been leaking for years. Brookhaven’s challenge was in distinguishing between water added to the pool to replace evaporation and water replacing leakage. They assumed the makeup was only for evaporation. While a spent fuel pool containing spent fuel will experience more evaporation than an emptied spent fuel pool, both will experience evaporation of tritiated water.

In the late 2000s after monitoring wells were installed at the then-operating Pilgrim nuclear plant, tritium was detected in one or more of the wells. It was attributed to rainfall rather than leakage from pools, tanks, and/or pipes. Dave Lochbaum researched this explanation reviewing the annual reports submitted for Pilgrim the prior three or four years. The data showed that 94% of the tritium released from Pilgrim over that period was from evaporation of its spent fuel pool water. This reality supported the theory that rainfall returned tritium to the ground where it migrated into the monitoring wells. No leakage from any other location was ever identified.

Storage onsite, whether in spent fuel pools or storage tanks, does not mean tritium will not be released. It will evaporate from pools and from vented tanks. It will then be breathed by downwinders or consumed by people drinking water or consuming foodstuffs containing tritium returning to earth.  Through the evaporation mechanism, aerosolized tritium could migrate towards and into the local host community.

Characterization, Limits, and Treatment Methods

Aside from the spent fuel pools, what other sources of radioactive water are present at Indian Point?
The Unit 2 and Unit 3 spent fuel pools are the primary sources of radioactive water still at Indian Point. In addition to the Unit 2 and Unit 3 spent fuel pools, other sources include the systems related to the use of cooling water connected to the Unit 2 and Unit 2 spent fuel pools, including treatment tanks, refueling water storage tanks, reactor cavities, discharge canal chambers, and the floor and equipment drains inside buildings. These drains collect any water leaked or spilled and route it to waste tanks. The waste tanks are processed as necessary to allow water to be re-used in the plant – a lesser option now that the reactors are shut down - or discharged to the river.
 

How does the amount and concentration of tritium released into The Hudson River during the operation of Indian Point ’s reactors compare with the proposed amount and concentration of tritium to be released in 2023 & onwards from the storage tanks?
Based on the maximum volumes of the containment chambers still holding water, including two spent fuel pools (Unit 2 and Unit 3), it is expected that  total water volume for remaining processed wastewater discharges to be a far lower volume than when the nuclear reactors were operational. According to Holtec’s presentation to the DOB on April 27, 2023, there is approximately 1.5 million gallons of water remaining at the plant that is planned to be treated and discharged over a period of several years (versus an average of 3.37 million gallons per year during recent years when two of the reactors were operating ). Furthermore, Holtec noted that the total radioactivity remaining onsite is approximately 400 curies, compared to historical annual discharges during plant operation of approximately 1,200 curies per year (which resulted in a dose level to the public of less than 1% of NRC’s regulatory limit).
 

Please describe the monitoring and characterization of spent fuel pool water at Indian Point. Who is required to perform the testing? What is tested for? Does the federal government verify the testing methodology, testing equipment, and testing results? Can the public view the test results?
The Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) SPDES Permit requires the facility to sample at various frequencies and submit those results though Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMR) to DEC on a monthly basis.  DEC reviews the DMR data to ensure compliance with the effluent limits under DEC’s jurisdiction.  

The Department of Health has three water sampling locations near Indian Point, one of which is near the discharge location, the others being upstream and downstream of the facility.

The controls in place to monitor and account for radionuclides in water discharged to the river is described in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) attached to the 2021 annual effluent report submitted to the NRC by Holtec. Before a storage tank is discharged, its contents must first be recirculated for at least three tank volumes. For example, suppose a tank holds 11,750 gallons and the pump that recirculates water through it has a flow rate of 100 gallons per minute. The minimum recirculation time would be:

11,750 gallons x 3 tank volumes

100 gallon per minute recirc rate = 5.9 hours

After recirculation, a sample is drawn from the tank and analyzed to determine its radioactive contents (e.g., X picocuries/liter of tritium, Y picocuries/liter of nickel-63, Z picocuries/liter of cesium-137, etc.).

Federal regulations require split testing of the mandated samples – that is, samples collected and tested by two independent and federally-certified laboratories – and for results from the parallel testing to be annually provided to the NRC. NRC reserves the right to check every submittal.

The ODCM specifies a minimum dilution flow rate of 80,000 gallons per minute. The tank’s contents are pumped into the discharge canal through which the dilution flow is passing and the combined flow goes into the river. The sampling results are used to determine the setpoint for a radiation detector in the discharge piping. If radiation levels above that setpoint are detected, the discharge will be stopped. This radiation detector provides protection against sampling mistakes. If radioactivity unaccounted for during the analysis of the sampled water flow out the discharge path, their detection will result in termination of the release. Thus, it's a check and an additional barrier against unaccounted for releases of radioactivity to the Hudson River.

The sampling results and the tank’s volume are used to determine how much of each radionuclide was discharged. The annual reports submitted to the NRC tally up all the releases to specify how much of each radionuclide was released. For example, Table 4-5 of the report for 2021 indicated 0.00644 curies of Cobalt-60, 0.0013 curies of Cesium-137, and 0.0000775 curies of Ruthenium-103 were discharged from Unit 3.

Slide 7 of Mr. Lochbaum’s March 28, 2023 presentation to the Hendrick Hudson School District PTA shows the radiation monitor on the discharge canal to the lower right corner of the graphic. It is the green triangle symbol.

Another check and barrier are the offsite soil, fish, vegetation et al sampling. If the sampling pre-release misses anything significant, the offsite sampling provides a means of detecting it.

View the Indian Point Units 1, 2, and 3 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2021 on the NRC website.

What studies of bioaccumulation are conducted to determine environmental and health impacts from discharges of tritiated water to the Hudson?
Indian Point has an established Radiological Environmental Monitoring program.  The purpose of this program is to monitor/measure the radiation and radioactivity detectable in the environment that may be attributable to the Indian Point plant. This program, initiated in 1958, includes the collection, analysis, and evaluation of radiological data in order to assess the impact of Indian Point on the environment. Nuclear licensees provide an annual report to NRC each year.  These are made publicly available on the NRC website. The latest report is dated May 3, 2022 and consists of sampling data and analyses from January 1 to December 31 of 2021. See Radioactive Effluent and Environmental Reports for Indian Point 2 & 3.

The DOB’s independent technical expert reviewed the annual radiological environmental reports required by federal regulations to be submitted to the NRC. These reports include results from hundreds of samples of river water, drinking water, riverbed soils, fish in the river, and vegetation collected each year. The results were reviewed to see whether releases of water from Indian Point is concentrating or bio accumulating (i.e., releases far below the permitted levels collecting to pose larger hazards.) No such adverse trends were found. View the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for the calendar year 2021 for the Indian Point Energy Center.

What is the feasibility of deploying tritium removal technologies at Indian Point?

The DOB’s independent technical expert researched tritium removal technologies. While Mr. Lochbaum confirmed that tritium removal has been explored in Japan and Canada, he has not come across a commercial nuclear power plant, operating or being decommissioned, that has used a system for removing tritium from water. He did identify an EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, CA) report of a lab system circa 2016 that showed the method could remove tritium, but was not a viable solution on a large scale.

Mr. Lochbaum further notes that the Canadian and Japanese methods do not make tritium disappear. Canada extracts the tritium from water in a gaseous form which is then sold for use in tritium exit signs. Thus, even if a skid could be delivered to Indian Point and placed in service, there would still be tritium gas to deal with -- either store, ship offsite, or release to the air.

Questions Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts

(Dated:  May 26, 2023)

• Why are discharges regulated differently between Massachusetts and New York?
• Why does EPA state that radiological discharges are not allowed in Massachusetts, but New York State DEC states its SPDES permit does not regulate radiological discharges?
• Why has New York State not prohibited the discharge of tritiated spent fuel pool water similar to what EPA has done in Cape Cod?
   

EPA is best able to speak to its regulatory posture in another state such as Massachusetts. Different regulatory frameworks may exist in different states, and different facilities may have different regulatory licensing bases. 

Nevertheless, these and similar questions or statements either misperceive underlying facts and agency statements or reflect incorrect assumptions. 

Summary: Controlled radiological liquid discharges from nuclear sites with federal Atomic Energy Act licenses occur under the regulatory auspices of the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The federal EPA has confirmed that it does not regulate such radiological discharges at Atomic Energy Act licensed sites. On this point, the rule of law regarding controlled radiological discharges is the same for Indian Point and Pilgrim. 

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Additional Context:  By way of further background, in New York, the State has an EPA approved program to implement and enforce the Clean Water Act – known as the “SPDES” program.  As a result of that EPA approval, there is not an EPA-issued “NPDES” permit that governs various operations at the Indian Point site in New York. 

Turning to Massachusetts, where the Pilgrim Plant is located, the Commonwealth does not have an EPA approved program; hence, the various non-radiological discharge operations at the Pilgrim site are regulated by an EPA issued “NPDES” permit. Looking at the EPA NPDES permit for Pilgrim Station, the language there (IA23) states radiological releases are under the auspices of the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  The discharge of radioactive materials shall be in accordance with and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements (10 C.F.R. Part 20 and NRC Technical Specifications set forth in facility operating license, DPR-35).  EPA has not prohibited radiological releases at Pilgrim.  At the time the EPA NPDES permit was issued for the Pilgrim facility, water in the spent fuel pool had not yet been characterized; the EPA NPDES permit provided that the discharge of pollutants in spent fuel pool water (including, but not limited to, boron) is not authorized by this permit (IB2).  EPA has stated in correspondence to Holtec that “a more detailed characterization of the pollutants in the [Pilgrim] spent fuel pool water would be required before any discharge would be authorized under the CWA.”  The Pilgrim facility appears to be addressing the issue and characterizing that water.

To summarize, radiological discharges from the Pilgrim and Indian Point facilities are regulated by and under the auspices of the NRC.  Moreover, EPA has stated in correspondence to Holtec that “an [EPA CWA] NPDES permit can neither prohibit nor authorize the discharge of [NRC-regulated] radioactive materials.”  Similarly, such discharges are not subject to or within the scope of the New York State DEC’s SPDES Permit.  No condition in the EPA-issued NPDES permit for Pilgrim provides a basis for concluding that New York (or DEC) has a legal basis for regulating liquid radiological effluent from NRC-license nuclear power plants.

During the public meeting convened by the Decommissioning Oversight Board on April 27, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency discussed this issue and confirmed the understanding summarized here.

Additional Questions

Will there be public hearings on the Citizen Participation Plan for remediation work under the auspices of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation?­
NYSDEC’s regulations (6NYCRR Section 375-1.10) require all remedial programs to include citizen participation activities which, at a minimum, shall include the preparation of a citizen participation plan, establishment of a document repository and public notice with a prescribed comment period at select milestones. The primary goals of the citizen participation program at sites are to facilitate communication with individuals, groups, and organizations that have expressed interest in or are affected by the site or the site's program in the decision-making process associated with the remediation of sites. The Citizen Participation (CP) Plan (CPP or CP Plan) that is in place  provides information about how NYSDEC and Holtec will inform and involve the public during the investigation and cleanup of the Site.  Holtec has agreed to cooperate with the Department and provide reasonable assistance in soliciting public comment on the work plans and reports identified for public comment in the CP Plan, proposed remedial action plans, and additional work plans and/or reports as the Department may require. The CP Plan is available to the public at https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/indianpointcpp.pdf. Additional information on DEC’s oversight of Indian Point is available at https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/126311.html.

Where does the processed and unprocessed water go? Where does the removed asbestos go?
Processed and unprocessed water is monitored (each tank is sampled and analyzed by qualified technicians prior to release) before being discharged into the discharge canal and then to the river through a variety of tanks and outfall piping. If the monitoring results indicate concentrations are higher than desired, then the water is retained for additional treatment prior to discharge. The concentrations in the discharged water are summarized and reported to NYSDEC (for non-radiological contaminants) and US NRC (for radiological contaminants), in accordance with Holtec’s SPDES Permit and NRC License, respectively.

Prior to demolition activities, the local municipality must issue a building demolition permit. Holtec’s contractor is required to perform an asbestos assessment prior to any demolition.  If asbestos is detected, abatement is required and the NYS Department of Labor (NYSDOL) must be notified, and is responsible for overseeing the proper testing, abatement and disposal from an asbestos contaminated structure.  NYSDEC has been in contact with NYSDOL and they are aware of the potential asbestos at this facility.

How high of a radioactivity concentration is allowed for discharge into the river?
The discharge limits are based on the doses resulting from exposure to contaminants which are compared to the overall dose limits required by two federal agencies, the US NRC (10 CFR Part 20 regulations) and US EPA (40 CFR Part 190 regulations). Wastewater is sampled and analyzed to ensure that any water that is discharged meets the acceptable limits. These limits are based on a calculation of the potential doses to the public using the possible exposure pathways laid out in Holtec’s Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) which are compared to the regulatory limits for doses to the public. According to Holtec:

The station liquid discharges are maintained well below our internal guidelines and do not exceed 1/10th of 1% of the allowable NRC and EPA limits. This demonstrates that historically, [Indian Point’s] discharges have been and will continue to be far below the regulatory limit.

This information is reported annually in the Annual Radiological Effluent Release Reports, which are available to the public on the NRC website at: https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/tritium/plant-info.html.

What are Holtec's plans regarding the remaining spent fuel pool water?
At the March 17, 2022 DOB meeting, Holtec indicated its plans for discharges of remaining spent fuel pool water in stating:

Total number of gallons between the two [reactor water storage tanks] and the spent fuel pools is about 1.3 million gallons. This water will not be discharged until all fuel is casked and segmentation efforts are complete. [This is estimated to occur in] 2023 [or] 2024.

Holtec also provided additional detail on the discharge treatment, filtering, and monitoring process, contextualization of all processed and unprocessed water remaining at Indian Point, and state and federal regulations governing discharges. Read Holtec’s full presentation.

At the February 2, 2023 DOB meeting, Holtec reiterated its plans for spent fuel pool water discharges in the late summer or early fall timeframe for the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.

New York State will ensure that any discharge of regulated pollutants from the facility meets Holtec’s State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit requirements.

Since Holtec has a SPDES permit, is Holtec authorized to discharge spent fuel pool water?
Radiological discharges from the facility are regulated by and under the auspices of the NRC. Those discharges are not subject to or within the scope of the DEC’s SPDES Permit.

Why will DEC conduct a full technical review of the SPDES permit?
This is the first time that the SPDES permit is being reviewed since the facility ceased operations.  Since the nature of their processes has changed, DEC will take this opportunity to ensure that the SPDES permit limits are protective of the environment given current circumstances.

EPA has determined that the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant in Massachusetts is not authorized to discharge spent fuel pool water because the facility’s NPDES permit specifically prohibits that discharge. Can they make the same determination for Indian Point?
NYS can’t speak for EPA.  NYS has an approved program to implement and enforce the Clean Water Act – the SPDES program.  As a result, there is not an EPA-issued NPDES permit that governs operations at the Indian Point site.  The Pilgrim Plant is regulated by an EPA NPDES permit that includes a specific condition prohibiting the discharge of pollutants in spent fuel pool water.
 

The NYS Department of Health used to make water monitoring of radiation available to the public. The last data were released in 2003. Where is the data from the past 20 years? Will it be presented as part of the DOB discussion of wastewater discharge?
The New York State Department of Health (DOH) maintains its publicly-viewable and downloadable reports, including on the monitoring of radiation in water near Indian Point, at www.Health.Data.NY.Gov. View a direct link to data on tritium levels, and a direct link to data on iodine-131 levels. This data collected by DOH will serve as critical inputs into the DOB discussion on spent fuel pool water discharge at an upcoming meeting.
 

Does tritiated water evaporate more quickly than regular water? If not, how it is possible to evaporate 92% of tritiated water and not just be evaporating 92% of all the water?
According to the DOB’s independent technical expert Dave Lochbaum:

“In the mid-2000s in response to water leaking from the spent fuel pools at Indian Point and from a discharge line at the Braidwood nuclear plant in Illinois, plant owners installed wells to monitor their sites for leakage. Monitoring wells at the Pilgrim plant in Massachusetts detected tritium. NRC attributed it to rainfall. To probe this assertion, Mr. Lochbaum reviewed the annual radiological effluent reports for Pilgrim. In the prior years, 94 percent of the tritium released from the plant was via evaporation of spent fuel pool water. Only 6 percent of the tritium released from the plant was in the thousands of gallons of water discharged to the bay.

The evaporation rate for tritiated water is the same as for normal water. As spent fuel pool water evaporates, owners periodically top off the level to maintain it within a specified range. As "clean" water flows through spent fuel bundles in storage racks in the pool, water molecules may absorb a neutron emitted from the decaying fuel and have a hydrogen atom become tritium.

Evaporation from the spent fuel pool flows through a ventilation system. The ductwork contains radiation detectors that stop the flow if high radiation levels are detected. Periodically, samples of the flow are drawn and analyzed to define the isotopic composition of the exhaust gas. The flow rate is recorded and multiplied by the isotopic concentrations to determine how much of each radionuclide has been released to the atmosphere. Those tallies are then reported annually to the NRC.”

School and Community Monitoring Working Group

Is there a medical or health expert from the Department of Health on the Working Group? Will they be present during upcoming public forums to address parents’ questions and concerns?
Expert staff of the New York State Department of Health (DOH) have served as active members of the DOB’s Monitoring Working Group since the group’s inception in summer 2021. The DOB staff members’ credentials and experience include multiple graduate degrees, including master’s in public health, Board certification in Health Physics, expertise in radiation biology and radiation effects, and over 30 years’ experience in radiation protection. DOH is also supporting the CAMP RFP process to procure community air monitoring for the school district and communities surrounding Indian Point, will participate in the contractor selection process to ensure the selected vendor meets the requisite criteria, and will participate in the open meeting and public forum currently being coordinated with the Buchanan-Verplanck Elementary School PTA.

Why are there no parents on the monitoring working group?
The Monitoring Working Group was established immediately following the creation of the DOB thanks to the advocacy of parents in the community and the Superintendent of the Hendrick Hudson School District. While the Working Group is comprised solely of DOB Board Members and technical experts, the Group included the Superintendent and regularly received, considered, and incorporated input from parents and their representatives in determining scientific-based solutions to incorporate the BV Elementary School, and the health and safety considerations of its student body, in any monitoring plan. These public comments and concerns were considered in the development of the Community Air Monitoring Plan (CAMP) Request for Proposals (RFP), which includes real-time monitoring for VOCs, PM-10 and radioactive materials at the Indian Point perimeter. 

The Monitoring Working Group additionally participated in a public forum organized by the Hendrick Hudson School District PTA Advocacy Committee on March 28, 2023. Public comments and concerns were considered in the development of the CAMP RFP which includes real-time monitoring for VOCs, PM-10 and radioactive materials at the Indian Point perimeter. The DOB will continue to work with the PTA and Superintendent to identify additional opportunities to engage with the parental and school community.

Existing Dust Mitigation

How is dust prevented from leaving the site?
Rules and regulations are designed to prevent releases of material from the site, and the State will monitor decommissioning activities with this important principle in mind. Several factors collectively lessen the chances that dust from decommissioning activities will affect the public offsite or workers onsite.

One of the first steps during decommissioning involves extensive surveying and sampling of the buildings and grounds to identify the locations of radioactive materials, asbestos, toxic chemicals, and other hazardous materials requiring special handling. These results inform the planning for the decommissioning work, including measures to guard against uncontrolled releases.

Buildings housing contaminated components or with concrete walls saturated with radioisotopes with longer half-lives will be dismantled from the inside out. During dismantling, air leaving the buildings flows through ducts and stacks monitored by radiation detectors. Excessive radiation levels will cause an alarm so the exhaust flow can be stopped. These detectors provide real-time, continuous protection against excessive releases of radioactivity to the air.

There are two backstops guarding against airborne radioactivity bypassing the radiation detectors and blowing downwind. The first and more rapid backstop are the personnel radiation monitors worn by workers performing decommissioning activities on contaminated equipment. The workers are closest to the creation of airborne radioactivity. The personnel radiation monitors would provide rapid – often even same day – indication of a problem to allow timely intervention and remediation as necessary.

The second backstop is the series of eight air sampling units located approximately one-quarter mile to just over 20 miles from the site that are operated 24/7 and checked at least weekly by the plant operator for radiation levels. In addition, more than three dozen radiation monitors are located offsite around Indian Point. These radiation monitors are collected each quarter. The most recent data is publicly available on the USNRC website: Radioactive Effluent and Environmental Reports for Indian Point 2 & 3.

The effectiveness of the policies and procedures has been demonstrated in practice with the decommissioning of the Big Rock Point (MI), Yankee Rowe (MA), Zion (IL), and Rancho Seco (CA) nuclear plants.

These, and other, nuclear facilities have been decommissioned without experiencing airborne radioactivity releases in excess of federal limits.

New York State also has another tool to mitigate the migration of dust. State regulations also prohibit air pollution under 6 NYCRR part 211.1, which set standards about dust (among other pollutants) that is generated from any activity, including demolition. As a proactive measure, NYS DEC worked with the Village of Buchanan to directly incorporate these State standards into their demolition permit process. This provides for additional regulatory requirements on dust control and improves the local government’s ability to halt any process that violates the demolition permit conditions. The State’s on-site inspector will be able to observe any dust issues during heavy demolition and alert Holtec and the proper authorities if there are potential violations of NRC, state, or local requirements.

The pre-work mapping of radioactive material locations, the radioactive decay of short-lived radioisotopes, the monitoring of pathways for airborne radioactivity released during decommissioning work, the radiation monitoring of workers performing decommissioning work, the offsite radiation monitoring, and the additional New York State and local oversight over planned demolition collectively lessen the chances for harmful amounts of radioactive gases and particles to be deposited offsite.

Existing Monitoring

Is air monitoring data available to the public?
A section of the DOB website is dedicated to community monitoring data (https://dps.ny.gov/community-monitoring). This page includes a link to reports filed by Indian Point with NRC regarding radiological effluent releases. The direct link to this page is https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/tritium/plant-specific-reports/ip2-3.html. In addition, New York State performs water and air environmental radiation surveillance near Indian Point. Several links to this data are also available on the DOB’s community monitoring webpage.
 

Has anyone tested dust in any location outside Indian Point? Has anyone tested Buchanan Verplanck Elementary for radiological particulates?
The DOB created a Monitoring Working Group in summer 2021. After initial discussions, the Working Group recommended that a request for proposals (RFP) be issued to procure environmental consulting services to develop a Community Air Monitoring Plan (CAMP) with primary focus on fence-line monitors. The RFP was issued January 9, 2023. The Monitoring Working Group will work with the selected contractor to determine science-based solutions to incorporate the BV Elementary school. At the April 27, 2023 meeting of the DOB, the Chair announced that the state was allocating $500,000 to the Hendrick Hudson School District for the purpose of conducting an environmental assessment of the BV elementary school.

In Massachusetts, the Department of Health keeps records of incidents of cancer in towns throughout the state. Could the DOB check with the NYS Department of Health to see if they have kept such records?
Cancer maps are available for all of New York State. See the following link for maps and data.  https://apps.health.ny.gov/statistics/cancer/environmental_facilities/mapping/map/

Dust Mitigation

What dust mitigation measures are in place to prevent the generation and migration of dust resulting from demolition activities?

Rules and regulations are designed to prevent releases of material from the site, and the State will monitor decommissioning activities with this important principle in mind. Several factors collectively lessen the chances that dust from decommissioning activities affecting the public offsite or workers onsite.

One of the first steps during decommissioning involves extensive surveying and sampling of the buildings and grounds to identify the locations of radioactive materials, asbestos, toxic chemicals, and other hazardous materials requiring special handling. These results inform the planning for the decommissioning work, including measures to guard against uncontrolled releases.

The preparation for physical decommissioning work takes time, time that helps lessen potential hazards. For example, radioisotope iodine-131 (I-131) has a half-life of about 8 days. It has essentially decayed away after ten half-lives, or approximately 80 days. The threat from I-131 exposure is the reason that potassium iodide (KI) pills may be distributed following a nuclear reactor accident. With the I-131 diminished within three months of permanent reactor shutdown, it quickly fades with time.

Buildings housing contaminated components or with concrete walls saturated with radioisotopes with longer half-lives will be dismantled from the inside out. During dismantling, air leaving the buildings flows through ducts and stacks monitored by radiation detectors. Excessive radiation levels are alarmed so the exhaust flow can be stopped. These detectors provide real-time, continuous protection against excessive releases of radioactivity to the air.

There are two backstops guarding against airborne radioactivity bypassing the radiation detectors and blowing downwind. The first and more rapid backstop are the personnel radiation monitors worn by workers performing decommissioning activities on contaminated equipment. The workers are closest to the creation of airborne radioactivity. The personnel radiation monitors would provide rapid – often even same day – indication of a problem to allow timely intervention and remediation as necessary.

The second backstop is the series of eight air sampling units located approximately one-quarter mile to just over 20 miles from the site that are operated 24/7 and checked at least weekly by the plant operator for radiation levels. In addition, more than three dozen radiation monitors are located offsite around Indian Point. These radiation monitors are collected each quarter. The most recent data is publicly available here: https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/tritium/plant-specific-reports/ip2-3.html.

The effectiveness of the policies and procedures has been demonstrated in practice with the decommissioning of the Big Rock Point (MI), Yankee Rowe (MA), Maine Yankee (ME), Zion (IL), and Rancho Seco (CA) nuclear plants.

These, and other, nuclear facilities have been decommissioned without experiencing airborne radioactivity releases in excess of federal limits.

The pre-work mapping of radioactive material locations, the radioactive decay of short-lived radioisotopes, the monitoring of pathways for airborne radioactivity released during decommissioning work, the radiation monitoring of workers performing decommissioning work, and the offsite radiation monitoring collectively lessen the chances for harmful amounts of radioactive gases and particles to be deposited offsite.

The Indian Point facility should be tented, demolition should only occur in the summer, and schools need to be deep cleaned daily. I don’t believe there won’t be any dust.
“Tenting” is the act of encompassing a building with a physical apparatus designed to contain particulate and gaseous substances from release. This differs from the “netting,”, or “vertical safety netting” often seen on certain high-rise structures, particularly in dense settings like New York City, the purpose of which is to protect people and equipment – particularly those on the ground – from the threat of falling debris.

As each phase of decommissioning commences, New York State will ask Holtec to describe the dust mitigation measures it plans to take and consider whether physical containment is warranted. During the current decommissioning phase, Holtec indicated it plans to conduct vessel segmentation within the Unit 2 and Unit 3 containment domes, under negative pressure and under water, further reducing the potential for the release of particulate matter.  In addition, DEC and The Village of Buchanan also have the ability to monitor dust and are working together to incorporate State standards into the Village’s demolition permit process.

General Questions

Are all radiological dispersal events required to be reported to the proper federal, state, and local government entities?
Consistent with federal regulation, Holtec is required to report radiological dispersal events to the NRC. Holtec has indicated that radiological dispersal event notifications will comply with applicable federal, state, and local regulations. (March 2022)

Is the community monitoring currently in place for air only?  
No, monitoring exists for air as well as other environmental media.  There is monitoring data from the operator and from the New York State Department of Health (DOH) for the past several decades that is of fish, soil, water, and air.   These data have been available to the public.  In addition, these data are available via the website (https://dps.ny.gov/indianpoint). The DOB is further working with its independent technical expert and DOH on additional ways to make it more accessible. (March 2023) 

New York State had a monitoring program in the 1990s by the health department that translated results to the public. Would the DOB research this program?
The New York State Department of Health measures the air and water near Indian Point and other locations (background) around New York to determine the normal levels of radioactivity and monitors the influence of human activities on these levels. The results of this monitoring program is posted at www.health.data.ny.gov. Records dating back to 2009 are currently available on this website, but older records may be obtained by contacting the Department of Health. Here is a direct link to the most recent data: https://health.data.ny.gov/Health/Environmental-Radiation-Surveillance-Indian-Point-/ms7x-sfpf.

Why is constant interval monitoring being turned off? What long-term monitoring will be in place around ISFSI?
Because risks are different and greatly reduced after spent fuel is transferred to the ISFSI, Holtec has indicated the 16 Reuter-Stokes constant interval monitors surrounding Indian Point will remain in operation through the transfer of spent fuel to the ISFSI. The DOB School Monitoring Working Group issued recommendations in September 2021 that a multi-layered monitoring approach, including continuous air monitors and fixed air samplers, be taken after all spent fuel is transferred to the ISFSI. To support the recommendations of the Working Group to bolster monitoring, New York State secured a $500,000 award from Entergy’s Community and Environmental Benefit Fund. The DOB and the Working Group, in consultation with the Hendrick Hudson School District, will continue to explore appropriate monitoring apparatus moving forward. (March 2022)

Is $500,000 enough for monitoring? If not, what will be done to meet needs?
As the next phase of decommissioning nears (tentatively 2024), the Monitoring Working Group will reconvene to identify next steps and make additional recommendations, including appropriate monitoring equipment, ancillary needs, and resources necessary for maintenance. As one input to this process, a Columbia University graduate class is working on a project to evaluate the potential impacts of decommissioning activities at the BV School, and they will make recommendations to the DOB, School Monitoring Working Group, and school district on potential uses of the $500,000 grant. (March 2022)

Is there a way to translate monitoring reports to the public in real time?
NYS is actively engaging with Holtec and Hendrick Hudson School District on how to best provide monitoring data to the public that is both clear and informative. (March 2022)

Would the monitoring plan catch the type of contamination that happened at the middle school in Ohio?
Indian Point, as a deactivated nuclear power facility, must meet more stringent NRC regulatory standards than the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (in Ohio) was subject to.

The monitoring equipment and protocols (including soil sampling) currently in use at Indian Point are designed to identify any releases of radioactivity from the site and give operators data and alarms to stop such releases.  The School Monitoring Working Group reviewed the existing real time monitors at the site and off-site and presented that information at the October 27, 2021 DOB meeting. As discussed at that meeting, the monitoring in place today is appropriate to detect the kinds of radioactive releases that are possible at this stage of decommissioning. By 2024, when all the fuel is in dry cask storage, the School Monitoring Working Group recommends that different monitoring equipment be deployed that would be appropriate for that stage of decommissioning. Also, a Columbia University graduate class is studying the issue further and will make recommendations to the DOB, School Monitoring Working Group, and Hendrick Hudson School District on monitoring plans and approaches for the school. (March 2022)

Why are students deciding what the monitoring needs are for BV Elementary School? Why not a firm with relevant experience and a track record by those that already have their degrees?
The School Monitoring Working Group includes experts in radiological monitoring, public health and air quality monitoring, and environmental monitoring. As the next phase of decommissioning nears (tentatively Q4 2023), the School Monitoring Working Group continues to convene to identify next steps and make additional recommendations, including appropriate monitoring equipment, ancillary needs, and resources necessary for maintenance. As one input to this process, a Columbia University graduate class, led by Cortlandt resident Professor Jonathan Hollander, PhD, is working on a project to evaluate the potential impacts of decommissioning activities at the BV Elementary School, and they will make recommendations to the DOB, School Monitoring Working Group, and Hendrick Hudson School District on potential uses of the $500,000 grant. These recommendations made by the Columbia University students will be subjected to rigorous expert review by New York State agency staff and the DOB’s technical expert. (May 2022)

­
What will happen if the monitoring plan recommended by the student project is more than the budgeted $500,000?­
The DOB, School Monitoring Working Group, and Hendrick Hudson School District will assess monitoring needs against available resources and make further recommendations as warranted. (May 2022)

How does the public view the radiation monitoring that happens every 15 seconds?­
The DOB and its School Monitoring Working Group are actively assessing the appropriate monitoring tools and processes, including the potential for providing the Hendrick Hudson School District with direct access to Reuter-Stokes radiological monitoring data. A public announcement will be made once final recommendations on radiation monitoring are made. (May 2022)

Who is the medical/health expert evaluating the health and safety at the school and the monitoring program?
Expert staff of the New York State Department of Health (DOH) have served as active members of the DOB’s Monitoring Working Group since the group’s inception in summer 2021. DOH is also supporting the request for proposals (RFP) to procure community air monitoring for the school district and communities surrounding Indian Point and will participate in the contractor selection process to ensure the selected vendor meets the requisite criteria. (December 2022)
 

Will the data from the monitoring be reported to the public and publicly available?
The Monitoring Working Group is in the process of issuing an RFP to procure environmental consulting services to establish a Community Air Monitoring Plan (CAMP), including determining how monitoring data is used. Further public comment will be sought as the process proceeds.

Existing protocols remain in place to ensure public safety notifications are made and other actions are taken if existing monitors and verification protocols indicate the presence of an imminent risk to the public. In addition, as a cornerstone of each public meeting of the DOB, the Department of Public Service reports on the latest readings of the Reuter-Stokes (RS) radiological monitors as well as any actionable anomalies and will continue to do so while the RS monitors remain in commission. (December 2022)
 

Were there any parents of the school children on the Monitoring Working Group?
The Monitoring Working Group was established immediately following the creation of the DOB thanks to the advocacy of parents in the community and the Superintendent of the Hendrick Hudson School District. While the Working Group is comprised solely of DOB Board Members and technical experts, the Group included Superintendent Hochreiter and regularly received, considered, and incorporated input from parents and their surrogates in determining scientific-based solutions to incorporate the BV Elementary School, and the health and safety considerations of its student body, in any monitoring plan. Further public comment will be sought as the process of establishing a Community Air Monitoring Plan (CAMP) proceeds. (December 2022)

Documented Issues at Pilgrim (Massachusetts)

How was the Cesium on the roof discovered at Pilgrim (Massachusetts)?  Is that system currently in place at Indian Point?

According to independent technical expert Dave Lochbaum:

NRC inspectors discovered the Cesium at the Pilgrim site in Plymouth, Massachusetts. NRC’s regulations require extensive surveys prior to decommissioning activities in order to inventory the location and nature of radiological and toxic contamination. For the Trash Compaction Facility (TCF), there was a Disposition Survey Plan #2022-05 and an accompanying “Disposition and Data Report Summary” containing the survey results which showed that all four samples of sediment collected from the TCF roof tested positive for Cesium-137. These regulations apply to Indian Point.

The NRC’s inspection reports do list the documents reviewed by the NRC inspectors. Some of these records are publicly available, like the annual effluent reports and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.  But most of these documents are not publicly available, even in response to a federal Freedom of Information Act request filed with the federal NRC. For example, it would be informative to review procedures “6-3.061 Special Radiological Survey Techniques” and “P-EN-RP-210 Controlled Area Monitoring Program” to see if they provided adequate guidance for workers to perform these tasks effectively, or whether they contain error-traps workers could fall into.

How did Cesium end up on the roof at Pilgrim? Can you be confident it isn’t on other surfaces at or near Pilgrim? Can you be confident it hasn’t happened at Indian Point?

According to independent technical expert Dave Lochbaum:

Two NRC inspectors were onsite the week of August 22, 2022. Both inspectors were health physicists and conducted three NRC Inspection Procedures related to radiation protection measures. The inspectors reviewed the TCF survey plan and summary report and challenged Holtec’s first explanation was that the Cesium resulted from fallout from above-ground nuclear weapons testing and from the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Holtec initiated a corrective action record to re-check its explanation and committed to re-survey the TCF roof to verify it meets criteria for unrestricted release and disposal.

The survey of the TCF was only one of many surveys required by the NRC’s regulations. The surveys look for radioactively contaminated equipment inside buildings as well as contamination in soil and exterior surfaces of buildings.

The corrective action initiated by the NRC’s questioning Holtec’s explanation for the source of the Cesium-137 will include what is called an extent-of-condition assessment. This assessment seeks to determine whether Cesium was found in other surveys and also dispatched with the questioned explanation.

Holtec’s explanation is hard to understand. In its annual radiological environmental report submitted to the NRC for 2019 (https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20136A368), Holtec wrote: “Some radioactivity is a result of nuclear weapons testing. Examples of radioactive fallout that is normally present in environmental samples are cesium-137 and strontium-90. Some examples of radioactive materials released from a nuclear power plant are cesium-137, iodine-131, strontium-90, and cobalt-60.” Yet when the company found Cesium-137, Holtec pointed to the former source without explaining why Holtec excluded the latter source. That report indicated that zero detectable amounts of Cesium were released to the air. It also indicated that offsite samples of soil, lobsters, surface water, and vegetation detected Cesium-137, but at low levels. Without additional review of the past decade-plus of annual reports for Pilgrim, it’s impossible to point to weapons testing, Chernobyl, Fukushima, or Pilgrim as the source for the Cesium on the TCF roof.

Holtec owns Pilgrim and Indian Point. The finding at Pilgrim should result in workers at Indian Point taking steps to avoid the same mistake. In addition, the NRC’s federal inspectors are aware of this mistake at Pilgrim and the federal agency might likely look for the same problem when that agency conducts inspections at Indian Point. This certainly does not provide absolute assurance it won’t happen at Indian Point, but it lessens the likelihood of recurrence.

Why did it take so long to report these Pilgrim issues to the public? 

According to independent technical expert Dave Lochbaum:

There were two separate issues: one was the Cs-137 on the roof, which was discovered in August 2022. The other issue was a worker exposure issue dealing with control rods in August 2020. Both are discussed further below.

(A)The Roof Issue at Pilgrim

The NRC inspectors identified the TCF roof issue in late August 2022 and was discussed – albeit sketchily – in a report issued November 18, 2022. That’s a routine timeline for reporting problems during decommissioning.

In addition to reviewing pending plans to dismantle the TCF, the NRC’s inspectors reviewed radiation records dating back to 2020. The NRC’s inspection program for decommissioning reactors features a suite of inspection procedures that are all performed periodically. Some are performed based on pending plant conditions (e.g., the TCF dismantling) while others are performed reviewing past activities.

(B) The Control Rod Issue at Pilgrim

Reviewing past records, the NRC’s inspectors in August 2022 found problems arising during the August 2020 removal of 145 control rods from the Pilgrim reactor. The control rods had “the potential for very high loose-surface contamination levels and the potential for the generation of airborne radioactivity.” The NRC’s inspectors determined that Holtec failed to implement required radiation protection measures against these potential hazards and as a result six workers received unplanned (and avoidable) radiation exposures. The NRC’s inspectors determined that the violation had “low safety significance” because the unplanned exposures were less than 10 millirem (NRC’s regulations permit occupational radiation exposures up to 5,000 millirem annually – zero unplanned exposure is permitted because luck becomes too large a factor protecting workers).

NRC Approach to Inspections and Reports

The detail-lite NRC inspection reports resulted from a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) a few years ago.  GAO identified numerous discrepancies across the NRC’s four regions in how the agency reported findings. One region might report one violation with eight examples while another region might report the same problem as eight violations. The GAO also found that some regions spent inordinate time writing and reviewing inspection reports, an issue emphasized by the nuclear industry since NRC invoices nuclear plant owners over $300 an hour for NRC staff time. The NRC’s fix to the GAO report was to attempt to implement a streamlined report generating process. NRC used to provide a fuller discussion of what they inspected and what they found.

If the NRC were to only include recent problems in its inspection reports, it might stop reviewing records from prior years. That could result in problems remaining undetected – and worse – uncorrected. The NRC lacks the resources to perform every inspection every quarter. The more important inspections (i.e., those covering areas of recurring problems and those covering areas of higher risk) are performed more frequently. Regardless of frequency, each inspection looks back to the last time the inspection was conducted.

Dave Lochbaum notes that every NRC finding actually reveals two problems: (1) the broken widget, and (2) the failure of the owner to have found the broken widget first. The NRC lets the owner off light by only ensuring the broken widget gets fixed. The NRC should also make sure the flawed inspection or testing regimes that allowed the widget to remain broken until NRC found it also gets fixed. To be fair, the better owners (e.g., Dominion, owner of the Millstone, Surry, and North Anna nuclear plants) do so without NRC’s pressure. But not every owner takes advantage of the opportunity to enhance its safety checks. 

DOE Responses to 12/7/22 Questions

The responses in this section were provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to questions raised at the December 7, 2022 DOB meeting.

Isn't interim storage in contradiction to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act which requires a permanent repository be designated first?

In the FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 appropriations language, DOE was directed by Congress to move forward under existing authority to identify a site for a federal interim storage facility. DOE was further directed to use a consent-based approach when undertaking these activities. DOE has not received funding or direction from Congress to work on a permanent repository since FY2010.

Will you consider the option of providing hardened onsite storage instead of transporting the waste off-site?

Under the Standard Contract (10 CFR Part 961) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, DOE’s responsibility is to arrange for, and provide, a cask(s) and all necessary transportation of the SNF and/or HLW from the Purchaser’s site (e.g., site owner) to the DOE facility. DOE’s responsibilities under the Standard Contract do not include providing continued storage at commercial nuclear power plant sites. In addition, the choice of which storage system to deploy at a nuclear power plant site is the responsibility of the site owner, not the DOE. 

Will the entire length of the train tracks used to transport spent fuel be inspected to make sure that there are no damaged or stressed areas that could be a potential issue transporting these heavy casks?

The regulations covering the inspection of railroad tracks come under the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and are not contained in DOE regulations. The FRA is preparing the document Safety Compliance and Coordination Oversight Plan (SCCOP) for Rail Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Used Nuclear Fuel. Previous versions of this document addressed track inspections.

Can DOE confidently get to some of the locations they mentioned for potential spent fuel transport (Croton, Peekskill South Street, Danbury, CT) without crossing the interstate natural gas pipeline because it goes under Rt. 9, Rt 84, Rt 684, Palisades, Taconic, etc.?

The shipping of spent nuclear fuel transportation casks via heavy haul trucks from the Indian Point site to a heavy haul truck-to-rail transload location would require permits from the State of New York and in some cases the State of Connecticut. Any permitting requirements regarding natural gas lines imposed by the State of New York or the State of Connecticut would be considered by the DOE in determining which heavy haul truck to rail transload location to use.

Has DOE considered the danger posed by shipping HLNW through Environmental Justice communities? Or the impacts on environmental justice communities in NM and TX that have been overburdened with exposure?

While a DOE Environmental Impact Statement would discuss the potential for impacts to affected communities, including disadvantaged communities, the regulations covering the rail routing of spent nuclear fuel are contained in 49 CFR 172.820 and come under the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA). In addition, evaluation of potential impacts from industry shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the private interim storage facilities being developed in New Mexico and Texas would be the responsibility of the NRC not the DOE.

What location will the casks be stored? Is there a federal site review program to implement a national spent rod storage site? When will the Federal government concentrate on and provide a permanent spent nuclear fuel storage facility?

In the FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 appropriations language, DOE was directed by Congress to move forward under existing authority to identify a site for a federal interim storage facility. DOE was further directed to use a consent-based approach when undertaking these activities. DOE has not received funding or direction by Congress to work on a permanent spent nuclear fuel disposal facility since FY 2010. In December 2021, DOE re-initiated a consent-based siting program to site one or more federal consolidated storage facilities. A request for information (RFI) on Using a Consent-Based Siting Process to Identify Federal Interim Storage Facilities was published in December 2021, and feedback received from the RFI informed the issuance of a DOE funding opportunity in September 2022 to Support Community Engagement with Consent-based Siting Activities. DOE currently plans to open and operate a federal consolidated interim storage facility in the 2030s.

Will the NRC/DOE comply with the 2004 Appeals Court ruling and establish a deep geologic repository following the National Academy of Science Safety Containment Guidelines of 300,000 years?

Federal agencies, including the DOE, are authorized to act in accordance with both Congressional direction and Appropriations. DOE has not received funding or direction from Congress to work on a permanent repository since FY 2010.  

Will the DOE forgo the safety preemption in order to engage in true Consent Based Siting?

Prioritization of safety is one of the key consent-based siting principles. Making safety a key principle is not inconsistent with a consent-based siting process. There are many locations in the United States that could be suitable for storing spent nuclear fuel in a licensed storage facility that meets safety regulations. There are currently more than 70 operating independent spent fuel storage installations in the US, mostly at nuclear power plant sites, that have been and continue to be assessed for safety and are licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, potential host communities may want to study the safety of a waste management facility themselves, which is why the consent-based siting process envisions providing resources to communities to support activities such as independent evaluations, and/or advisory services of independent experts.

Is the DOE committed by law and regulation to accept spent fuel in order of the reactors closing?

Section VI.B.1(b) of the Standard Contract (10 CFR Part 961) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, states that “Notwithstanding the age of the SNF and/or HLW, priority may be accorded any SNF and/or HLW removed from a civilian nuclear power reactor that has reached the end of its useful life or has been shut down permanently for whatever reason.”

In addition, in the December 2008 Report to Congress on the Demonstration of the Interim Storage of Spent Fuel from Decommissioned Nuclear Power Reactor Sites (DOE/RW-0596, 2008), DOE stated that:

The contract allows the OFF [oldest fuel first] queue to be altered under certain conditions with Department consent.  For instance, utility companies may, subject to Department approval, exchange places in the waste acceptance queue.  Additionally, the Department may alter the queue by granting priority acceptance in cases of emergencies or by permitting priority acceptance of the SNF from reactors that have permanently ceased operations (decommissioned reactors). The Department has been asked, on numerous occasions, to exercise its discretion under the Standard Contract to allow for the priority acceptance of SNF from decommissioned reactors.  In all instances, the Department has declined to grant this priority, noting that doing so would, because of the finite nature of the federal government’s planned waste acceptance capacity, adversely affect the timely removal of SNF from operating reactor sites.  In other words, acceleration in waste acceptance from a decommissioned reactor site would result in a corresponding delay in removing SNF from an operating reactor site.  Because of issues of equity that may result from this reallocation of waste acceptance capacity, the government has consistently advised the parties seeking such priority treatment to avail themselves of the exchange provisions of the Standard Contract that allow the utilities to exchange approved delivery commitments subject to the Department’s approval.

While the Standard Contract may allow priority to be accorded to SNF at shutdown commercial nuclear power plant sites, for the reasons discussed in the 2008 Report to Congress, DOE has not decided whether it would exercise, or under what circumstances it would, exercise the provision in the Standard Contract that affords priority to shutdown commercial nuclear power plant sites. 

Given issues of transportation and processing at a repository or at a CISF what would be a reasonable expectation of how many canisters could be processed in a year?

The rate at which canisters could be processed would be dependent on specific facility designs, available transportation infrastructure, and assumed canister sizes. If approximately 3,000 metric tons of heavy metal of SNF per year are assumed as the shipping/processing rate, this would equate to approximately 225 dual purpose canisters per year that would need to be processed at a repository or CISF in a year.

Roughly how far down the queue are units 2 and 3?

In the Acceptance Priority Ranking and Annual Capacity Report (DOE/RW-0567, July 2004), Appendix A, the first permanent discharge of SNF (40 assemblies) from Indian Point Unit 1 has a ranking date of 29 December 1972, the first permanent discharge of SNF (72 assemblies) from Indian Point Unit 2 has a ranking date of 30 March 1976, and the first permanent discharge of SNF (64 assemblies) from Indian Point Unit 3 has a ranking date of 7 June 1978.

If Holtec and Orano succeed in establishing a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, will they be able to choose how they accept spent fuel casks based upon their proprietary needs?

If Holtec or Orano established a private Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, DOE would have no role in the shipping of spent nuclear fuel to this facility or the acceptance of spent nuclear fuel at this facility, and DOE would have no influence over the operation of the facility, including how Holtec or Orano would accept spent fuel casks based upon their proprietary needs.

Given all the uncertainties of engineering, transportation and legality, would it be a fair statement to say that most of the spent fuel from Indian Point will be on site after 2050 and some may be on site a century from now?

DOE expects that it would take approximately 10 to 15 years to get to an operational phase of a consolidated storage facility through a consent-based siting process. The rate which SNF would be removed from Indian Point would depend on the acceptance priority given to the SNF at Indian Point, the interim storage facility SNF acceptance rate, available transportation infrastructure, and other factors. These parameters have not been established so it is premature to provide an estimate of when SNF might be removed from Indian Point.

How will answers to questions asked in the Q&A on Zoom or WebEx be disseminated?
Responses to substantive and novel questions raised in the appropriate Q&A fields on virtual platforms during public meetings will be posted under Matter # 21-01188 on the Department of Public Service website. We will endeavor to post responses online no fewer than two weeks in advance of each subsequent meeting. Please note: the chat feature (separate from the Q&A feature) is intended to support members of the public with technical issues and administrative questions related to the DOB meeting. Questions raised in the chat feature may not be captured and addressed.
 

Can there be public Q&A opportunities after each presentation?
Following feedback from elected representatives and directly from members of the community, engagement opportunities have expanded to include earlier public comment opportunities at each meeting, guest speakers from the community to interact directly with Decommissioning Oversight Board (DOB) members, and public forums — the first of which took place on July 27, 2022. While additional changes to meeting parameters are not being considered at this time in order to achieve the critical collaborative work and information sharing required of each working meeting of the DOB, the DOB remains committed to pursuing responses to all substantive and novel questions raised by the community.

Do contributions to a political campaign by Holtec or Enbridge (or businesses that work for them) count as a conflict of interest?
As adopted by the Decommissioning Oversight Board, the Board’s bylaws prohibit a Board Member from accepting gifts or anything of value where, among other things, it could reasonably be inferred that the gift could be intended to influence the member in the performance of the member’s Board duties.  The bylaws also prohibit any Board Member from holding any relationship to, employment relationship with, or financial interest in any company with an ownership or other financial interest in any retired or operating nuclear plant in the state, including related or parent companies, subsidiaries, contractors, agents, or shareholders. DOB members are required to submit annual certifications of compliance attesting to compliance with this provision. In the event any such member believes, or has a question with respect to whether, a Conflict of Interest exists, the member has a duty to disclose the potential Conflict of Interest to the legal counsel to the Board. The Board’s legal counsel will work with the member to determine whether a Conflict of Interest does in fact exist, and if so, to mitigate or eliminate (likely through a recusal framework) the Conflict of Interest.
 

Is the DOB planning to solicit input from an independent pipeline safety expert? Would the DOB invite Rick Kuprewicz to speak?
The DOB regularly enlists New York State’s pipeline safety experts from Department of Public Service to engage with the DOB on matters pertinent to the safe decommissioning of Indian Point. Nonetheless, the DOB values input from independent, impartial, and reputable subject matter experts. To that end, Mr. Kuprewicz accepted the DOB's request to present at its March 17, 2022 public meeting.
 

Would the DOB invite an environmental justice and community representative to sit on the DOB?
Per its bylaws, the DOB includes elected representatives of the communities surrounding Indian Point from nearly every level of local and state government, in addition to a representative of the environmental community, local labor representatives, an independent nuclear safety expert, and the Hendrick Hudson School District superintendent representing many families in the community.

The DOB is committed to engaging with all members of the Indian Point host communities, and welcomes invitations for relevant DOB representatives to meet with community organizations outside of regular DOB meetings. Information or issues that result from those community meetings can be brought to the full DOB for discussion.
 

Will you announce the next DOB meeting date at each prior meeting?
The DOB will seek to establish a calendar of scheduled DOB meetings for each upcoming year. At each meeting, the date for the next meeting will be publicly announced. We will also issue public notices, press releases, and social media posts in advance of each meeting. While dates are subject to change, the DOB is tentatively scheduled to hold public meetings from 6pm-9pm on the following dates in 2023:

• Thursday, February 2, 2023
• Thursday, April 27, 2023
• Wednesday, June 15, 2023
• Thursday, September 21, 2023
• Wednesday, December 6, 2023
   

What is the DOB's tip line for the public?
The whistleblower line set up by the DOB may be used by the public to alert potential wrongdoing.

Members of the public can raise concerns to the DOB in the following ways:

1. Through the Indian Point Wrongdoing (Whistleblower) Complaint Form on the DPS website.
2. By Email: [email protected]
3. By Calling the Tip Line: 518-486-1487
4. Through US Mail:
   New York State Department of Public Service
   Office of Investigations and Enforcement
   3 Empire State Plaza
   Albany, NY 12223

The public can also contact the following key regulators to file concern:

• New York State Department of Public Service
  Phone: 800-342-3377, Online: File a Complaint
• Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  Phone: 800-695-7403, Online: Report a Safety or Security Concern
• Federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
  Phone: 800-424-8802, Online: Incident Reporting

Beyond the public DOB meetings, what work is done by the Board to address community concerns?
The DOB takes all concerns and recommendations of the community seriously. The DOB and supporting staff not only reply to each substantive and novel question received, but also elevate issues raised by the public and, when warranted, advocate for improvements to be made. The community’s elected representatives, independent technical and environmental experts, and agency staff champion those concerns raised by the public and work to ensure compliance with regulations and agreements, and advocate for the safest achievable outcomes.

While DOB public meetings may be the most visible component of the Decommissioning Oversight Board, each meeting serves as an important part of the much broader scope of work conducted by members of the DOB to promote a safe and responsible decommissioning. Each year, thousands of staff hours are invested by Board members and their staff conducting rigorous state and local oversight that goes above and beyond what is statutorily required (in addition to federal oversight), providing substantive responses to questions and concerns raised by the public, and preparing for DOB meetings.

Why are there no Federal representatives on the DOB?
The DOB is a state and local body, inspired by legislation introduced by Senator Harckham and former Assemblywoman Galef, and provides a forum for information exchange on matters pertaining to decommissioning. The body plays an important public education and outreach function, with volumes of information available on its website, engaging public information forums and public statement hearing opportunities. It is also a forum for state regulatory bodies and local governments to coordinate activities relating to state and local oversight. While its membership is similarly focused on state and local representation, the DOB nonetheless regularly engages with federal agencies and the offices of Senator Gillibrand, Senator Schumer, and other members of the Hudson Valley’s congressional delegation, and continues to welcome presentations and updates on their work in our nation’s capital.
 

Can slides be presented ahead of each meeting? It is hard to follow dense slides.
While there may be instances in which slides may not be able to be published in advance, we will endeavor to post meeting presentations prior to the start time of each respective meeting.
 

Too much information is packed into meeting presentations. Please slow down so it is easier to digest.
As the decommissioning of Indian Point moves forward, we will continue to seek strategies and opportunities to discuss pertinent issues clearly and in depth, while continuing to offer opportunities for public comment.

Can a health expert be added to the DOB?
While the New York State Department of Health (DOH) has been an active participant on the DOB’s Monitoring Working Group, the Director of DOH’s Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection has participated in recent DOB public meetings and will do so moving forward.  The DOB staff members’ credentials and experience include multiple graduate degrees, including master’s in public health, Board certification in Health Physics, expertise in radiation biology and radiation effects, and over 30 years’ experience in radiation protection.

Decommissioning

Everything must go according to plan to avoid major consequences.
Regulations, standards, agreements, oversight, redundancies, and the plant shutting down all contribute to reduced risk profile at the site compared to when the plant was operational. As the spent fuel is removed from the cooling pools and transferred to dry cask (ISFSI) storage, risk of radiological releases from the site will be further reduced. One of the benefits provided by the Decommissioning Oversight Board is that decommissioning activities and government agency oversight activities can be discussed in regular public forums, and issues in need of further attention can be identified.
 

Is the DPS guidance document issued in June 2021 to Holtec available to the public?
To ensure clear and timely communication between Holtec and state regulators, DPS provided Holtec with a guidance document in June 2021 detailing the company’s emergency management and pipeline safety notification obligations. Holtec has acknowledged those obligations and complied with them as of March 2022. A redacted version of this document has been posted on the DPS website under matter #21-01188.

How do we access the citizen participation plan and scoping work plan?
The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) created an online depository for all documents required under the Order on Consent and Administrative Settlement re: Indian Point.  Please go to: https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/126311.html.

Will Holtec clean up contaminated soil? What about contamination known to be leaking into groundwater? How often will water be analyzed via Liquid Scintillation Analysis and NaI/HPGe detection for common fission products?
Holtec is required to meet New York State environmental and health standards and must submit a site characterization scoping plan outlining the overall program of remedial investigation of the site to the New York State DEC and Department of Health (DOH). That plan has been reviewed by DEC and DOH staff and is available to view at https://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/126311.html. 

In the event of detection of fission products such as Sr-90, Cs-137, and Tc-99, what detection limit thresholds will cause the NRC, New York State, and surrounding areas be notified of contaminants?
Under federal regulations, Holtec is required to report certain information concerning radiological materials to the NRC. According to Holtec, the Radiological Effluent Monitoring Program (REMP) remains in place with the same requirements as it did during prior operations. The REMP limits from the Indian Point Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) would prompt reporting to the NRC. This requirement is called out in both the ODCM and the site reporting procedures. The reporting requirements remain unchanged from when the reactors at Indian Point were in operation.

[Chart provided by Holtec]

New York State DOH measures the air and water near Indian Point and other locations (background) around New York to determine the normal levels of radioactivity and monitors the influence of human activities on these levels. The results of this monitoring program is posted at www.health.data.ny.gov. Records dating back to 2009 are currently available on this website, but older records may be obtained by contacting the Department of Health. This data is also viewable on the DOB website at https://dps.ny.gov/indian-point-community-monitoring.

What decontamination protocols will be undergone if contamination occurs as a direct result of Holtec manipulation of radioactive materials? Are there plans to vent into the water column/Hudson River or atmosphere in the event of liquid or air contamination in closed environments within Indian Point facilities?
According to Holtec, the decontamination methods specified in the DECON Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR)(ML19354A698) remain unchanged and comply with federal regulations. Site processes and procedures would be utilized to implement decontamination practices if contamination was detected onsite. Decontamination protocols remain unchanged from when the reactors at Indian Point were in operation.

What inspectors will be on site daily when any work is being done on Indian Point?
The DOB recognizes the benefit of having a resident inspector on site during the spent fuel transfer and decommissioning processes. Several members of the DOB have called on NRC to reinstate a resident inspector at Indian Point during these phases. Nonetheless, Governor Kathy Hochul took action at the state level.

At the recommendation of Senator Harckham and former Assemblywoman Galef, Governor Hochul called for the Department of Public Service (DPS) to hire a New York State Inspector to monitor spent fuel management and decommissioning activities in the 2022-23 Executive Budget. This state resident inspector was hired and is in place today. The state inspector provides more regular monitoring and oversight of decommissioning and spent fuel management activities and other operations on a day-to-day basis and provides regular reports to the DOB. While the state does not have the same jurisdiction as the NRC, it can and will refer any matters that may be beyond the state’s jurisdiction to relevant regulatory bodies.

Although the NRC does not require a resident inspector to be onsite during decommissioning, the NRC maintains Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2561, which details the many inspection programs meant to hold decommissioning power reactor operators accountable as a site transitions from permanent reactor shutdown, through active decommissioning, all the way to final site survey and release. The NRC utilizes nine “core” inspections programs that focus on areas ranging from plant decommissioning status, staffing, spent fuel safety and handling, transportation of radioactive materials, fire and radiation protection and environmental monitoring. Additionally, the NRC may use any number of additional inspection documents to further analyze aspects of a plant’s decommissioning, such as emergency preparedness, security, safety assessment and quality assurance programs. View NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2561; Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program. Appendix B: Periodic and Discretionary Inspection Documents for Decommissioning Power Reactors for more information.

IMC 2561 provides the estimated inspection hours supporting each core inspection program but, depending on the certain decommissioning activities being performed, additional inspection hours may be necessary to be completed. For example, during the actively decommissioning phase, when spent fuel is still in the fuel pool, inspection hours related to the plant’s fire protection program are double, and can even quadruple, as compared to the hours needed when the plant is offloading fuel from the reactor vessel. Inspection hours required for each program are expected to change over the course of decommissioning, depending on the plant status and activities being performed and the inspection hours listed in IMC 2561 are for single unit reactors; multi-unit decommissioning sites such as Indian Point require 1.5 times the listed hours. Inspection hours include both on- and offsite review, and can entail unannounced site visits, interviewing site personnel, and reviewing procedures and records. Overall, NRC personnel are expected to be at a facility 2 to 3 weeks of the month during active decommissioning. During storage operations, inspectors would be present several times a year. Finally, additional inspections and site visits may be warranted when a significant amount of public, State, and/or Congressional interest exists even though there may be little to no site activity taking place.

Please urge that NRC inspections be more rigorous during decommissioning.
New York State and the Decommissioning Oversight Board will continue to advocate for rigorous inspections during decommissioning. As discussed in the response to the previous question, the NRC maintains a separate Oversight and Inspection program for decommissioning power reactors. Although a number of the activities and inspections that occur during decommissioning are routine and occur frequently at operating plants, the Decommissioning Oversight Board expects NRC inspectors to give special attention to activities that relate to the safe storage of irradiated fuel and any activities that have the potential to result in offsite releases during decommissioning (such as the removal of a large component, like a steam generator).

During the different stages of decommissioning, the NRC will provide subject matter experts to oversee specific activities. For example, if a large component is to be removed from the plant, the NRC may require experts in numerous subjects, such as heavy lifting, crane operation, radiation protection, and radioactive waste packaging, to be onsite at the time of removal. Also, through the State Liaison Officer Program, New York State employees may accompany NRC inspectors during inspections, and anything identified by State employees would be processed, if applicable, by the NRC’s inspection and enforcement processes. All inspection results are documented in inspection reports and are made publicly available on the NRC’s online document management system.

Does SNC-Lavalin and Holtec no longer partnering in CDI change the Joint Agreement? Does Holtec have the money and decommissioning experience needed to safely complete decommissioning?
On January 19, 2022, Holtec notified regulatory agencies that Holtec terminated its partnership with SNC-Lavalin and its joint entity Comprehensive Decommissioning International (CDI), transitioning all decommissioning activities previously performed by CDI to Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI). As SNC-Lavalin and CDI is not a named party or signatory to the April 14,  2021 Joint Agreement, Holtec’s termination of SNC-Lavalin and CDI did not directly impact the corporate obligations included in the Joint Agreement.

At the March 17, 2022 DOB meeting, Holtec stated:

“Holtec performs all activities previously performed by C.D.I. at all of our sites, including managing and performing decommissioning and spent fuel management activities . . . Decommissioning resources and technical capabilities remained intact.

“There were no personnel changes on site as a result of the transition. The migration of resources from C.D.I. to H.D.I. is not expected to impact project costs, or decommissioning schedules at any of the Holtec sites. Further, Decommissioning Trust Fund financial assurances remain unaffected by this transition . . . H.D.I. is the licensee. It remains primarily accountable for regulatory licensing and compliance, the outcome of site investigations, responses to N.R.C. requests for information, et cetera. This change presents an opportunity to streamline and enhance H.D.I.’s organization.”

In addition, Holtec recently submitted a report on Indian Point’s decommissioning trust funds.  See Holtec “Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding,” dated March 25, 2022 (NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML 22084A059).

Which state agencies are involved in reviewing and commenting on Holtec’s exemption requests to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? 
Depending on the particular nature of Holtec’s request, appropriate technical, program, and legal staff from NYSERDA, DPS, DOH, DEC, DOS, DHSES and/or OAG may review Holtec’s exemption and license amendment requests, as well as other submittals.  Agency participation in review of any particular submittal varies based on the nature of the submittal, and agency staff expertise and jurisdiction.
 

Could subject experts compare and contrast best practices against Holtec’s decommissioning and spent fuel management plans?
New York State and members of the DOB routinely monitor decommissioning and spent fuel management plans, activities, and trends across the country. As the DOB explores specific issues relating to Holtec’s decommissioning and spent fuel management plans for Indian Point, the plans, activities, and trends at other facilities undoubtedly serve as important inputs into Board deliberations.
 

What is Hardened On-Site Storage? How does the ISFSI at Indian Point compare to the “HOSS” standard? Will the DOB advocate for “HOSS”?
Hardened on-site storage (HOSS) is a conceptual framework related to the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel near the site in which is the fuel was used. Given that spent fuel management – including cask design, on-site spent fuel storage, and the eventual transport of spent fuel to a national repository – is a core area of focus for the DOB, has discussed the requirements related to spent fuel management, cask design, and on-site spent fuel storage at public meetings.

Spent Fuel Management

Waste removal will include roads to rail. Will there be any barging?
According to Holtec, there is currently no change to the transportation of waste as stated in the Indian Point Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (ML19354A698) and the transport path remains the same as when the units at Indian Point were in operation. There are no plans to transport waste on the road in front of the local elementary school. The use of barge transportation is being studied and any future updates to Holtec’s transportation plans to use barges would be communicated with local and state authorities.
 

What is “low-level waste”?
In the United States, radioactive waste is divided into five categories:

1. High-level radioactive waste (spent nuclear fuel and waste produced from spent fuel reprocessing)
2. Uranium milling residues or tailings
3. Transuranic waste known as TRU (radioactive waste with greater than specified quantities of elements heavier than uranium)
4. Naturally occurring radioactive materials, or radioactive materials produced in an accelerator
5. Low-level radioactive waste

Low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) is primarily defined by what it is NOT.  LLRW is any radioactive waste that is not in the other four categories. As a result, low level waste is a very broad category containing many different types of waste and a wide range of radioactive content.

Some examples of LLRW

LLRW is generated at facilities such as nuclear power plants, hospitals, medical offices, industrial & manufacturing facilities, and research institutions. It includes radioactive materials used in various processes as well as supplies and equipment that have been contaminated with radioactive materials.  LLRW can include materials such as:

• shoe covers, lab coats, cleaning cloths, paper towels and other supplies used in an area where radioactive material is present.
• contaminated hand tools, components, piping, and other equipment from nuclear power plants and other industries.
• research equipment from laboratories where radioactive materials are used.
• ion exchange resins and filter materials used to clean water at a nuclear power plant.
• containers, cloth, paper, fluids, and equipment which came into contact with radioactive materials used in hospitals to diagnose or treat disease.
• filters from sampling devices used to test for airborne radioactive contamination; and
• carcasses of animals treated with radioactive materials used in medical or pharmaceutical research.

LLRW is divided into four classes based primarily on level of radioactivity:

1. Class A - contains the lowest radioactive concentration.
2. Class B - contains the next lowest radioactive concentration.
3. Class C - has the highest radioactive concentration allowed to be disposed of in a LLRW disposal facility.
4. Greater Than Class C (GTCC) - any LLRW exceeding the limits for Class C.

The Class A, B, and C waste categories are defined in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 61 (10CFR61).  Section 10CFR61.55 lists the radioactivity concentration limits of specific radioactive materials allowed in each of those low-level waste classes. LLRW not meeting the criteria for these three classes is known as Greater Than Class C or ‘GTCC’.

The radioactivity in LLRW can range from just above natural background levels to much higher levels, such as are seen in parts from inside the reactor vessel in a nuclear power plant. Low-level waste is typically stored onsite by licensees, either until it has decayed away and can be disposed of as ordinary trash, or until the accumulated amount becomes large enough to warrant shipment to a low-level waste disposal site.
 

Where is the low-level waste going?
The federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the Act) authorizes states to establish compacts that would allow in-state LLRW generators to dispose of waste at a common disposal facility. There are currently ten (10) interstate waste compacts in the country.  New York State has not joined a compact and remains unaffiliated.  As such, LLRW generators in New York may seek individual disposal relationships with any of the compacts or seek disposal at any commercial disposal facility.

There currently are four sited, commercial LLRW disposal facilities in the U.S.:

• Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Andrews, Texas
• EnergySolutions in Clive, Utah
• US Ecology in Richland, Washington
• EnergySolutions in Barnwell, South Carolina

The first three accept waste from New York, subject to their permitted waste acceptance criteria.

• The WCS - Texas facility accepts Class A, B, and C waste.  WCS can also accept ‘mixed waste’, which is radioactive waste that also contains hazardous waste components.
• The EnergySolutions - Utah facility can accept most Class A waste but not Class B or C.
• The US Ecology - Washington facility is authorized to accept limited volumes of LLRW containing small quantities of naturally occurring radioactive material (e.g., radium, uranium, and thorium) from New York State generators.

Holtec has entered into a contract with WCS for disposal of LLRW from the Indian Point, Oyster Creek, and Pilgrim decommissioning activities at the Andrews, Texas site.

NYSERDA monitors generation, storage, and management of LLRW within New York as well as its shipment, treatment, and disposal out of state.  This includes collection of annual reports from waste generators and publication of an annual status report which is submitted to the Governor and the Legislature each year. More information can be found here: https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/Researchers-and-Policymakers/Radioactive-Waste-Policy.
 

Why is the 20- to 25-year warranty on canisters/dry casks so short given the long time fuel will take to decay?
According to Holtec, while the warranty for the HI-STORM 100 storage system at Indian Point is 25 years, the systems are designed to last much longer than the warranty with proper aging management programs. Holtec uses the comparison to a motor vehicle warranty which is for a designated period of time, but the design life of the vehicle is a much longer length of time. Regardless of the length of the warranty, as the licensed owner of Indian Point, Holtec is responsible to ensure cask performance and compliance with NRC regulations to ensure the safety and security of its workforce and the public.
 

Why doesn’t Holtec use Hardened Onsite Storage instead of its current thin-walled canisters? What mitigation measures are in place given the canister’s shortcomings?
Holtec indicated it “strongly disagrees” with the characterization that Holtec’s canisters are “thin-walled.” In November 2021 correspondence to DPS, Holtec states:

[T]he HI-STORM system is a robust system that has been deployed around the world with no safety or radiological issues and is not designed, classified, or licensed as a “thin-walled” canister by the U.S. NRC or any regulatory organization in the world. First and foremost, this is a licensed system for fuel storage not just by the NRC but also by regulatory authorities in 14 countries around the world. No regulatory authority has ever denied a license of Holtec’s spent fuel storage systems. This is due to the proven technology and safety record of Holtec’s spent fuel storage systems. With over 1,500 systems that have been loaded to date, Holtec remains the leader in spent fuel storage around the globe. Further, as illustrated in the diagram below, the Holtec HI-STORM 100 system is a very robust system with an inner Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) made of ½ - ¾ inch stainless steel containing a basket to support the fuel assemblies, surrounded by a 10 inch think stainless steel lid that is strength welded shut, and backfilled with an inert gas (helium). The MPC is surrounded by 27 inches of steel and concrete and an overpack lid of 19 inches of steel and concrete. These systems stand 20 feet tall and weigh over 360,000 pounds fully loaded which makes each a hardened storage system. Our website features information on the robustness of the system including a test of flying a missile into the system, which shows the inner canister does not breach. In addition, many of the casks that other groups mention as thicker are not licensed in the US by the NRC for spent fuel storage. (March 2022)

[Diagram provided by Holtec]
 

Will spent fuel be shipped out west?
The federal government, has, by law, the ultimate responsibility for the transportation and final disposition of spent nuclear fuel.  Despite its representations to host communities during the licensing process, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and the Standard Contract, the federal government has not met its statutory and contractual obligations to take possession of, remove, and store spent and depleted radioactive nuclear fuel.  Because of this, Indian Point’s spent nuclear fuel will remain on site at Indian Point until the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) develops a plan to safely remove, transport, and store spent nuclear fuel. New York State remains laser-focused on this issue, which is why former Public Service Commission CEO and Chair John Howard wrote to DOE Secretary Granholm in March 2021 to request DOE’s schedule to collect and remove the spent nuclear fuel at Indian Point.

Holtec is actively packaging and shipping low level waste from the Indian Point site as a part of the decommissioning process.  At this time, contaminated material and low-level waste is being transported to Texas in secure containers in accordance with New York Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Transportation requirements.  They require that any hazardous materials are controlled and monitored during transport and any high hazard materials have containers designed to prevent release in accident conditions.  Holtec provided additional information on this topic during the October 27, 2021 Decommissioning Oversight Board meeting (Holtec Presentation 2021-10-27, slides 19-21) and provides Q&A on Indian Point Decommissioning at https://holtecinternational.com/communications-and-outreach/indian-point/.
 

What is “Plan B” for spent fuel storage if the United States Department of Energy (US DOE) does not allow spent fuel to be shipped to a central repository?
The Department of Public Service has reminded the US DOE about the federal government’s obligation to remove the radioactive spent nuclear fuel from the Indian Point site.  See March 26, 2021 letter from former DPS CEO John Howard to DOE Secretary Jennifer Granholm.  Absent establishment of a federal repository or interim storage facilities, it is likely that spent fuel will remain at the Indian Point site in dry cask storage in the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
 

When does Holtec expect to remove the spent fuel from the spent fuel pools completely and placed on the pads?
Consistent with the 2021 Joint Proposal between New York State, Holtec, and other parties, Holtec must complete the transfer of all spent nuclear fuel from the spent fuel pools to dry cask storage by December 31, 2024. At the February 2, 2023 meeting of the DOB, Holtec indicated it anticipates the transfer of all spent fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pools to dry cask storage will be completed by Q4 2023.
 

Why is fuel being transferred to the ISFSI so quickly? High-temperature/high-burnup fuel should remain in spent fuel pool for much longer than Holtec is planning.
In November 2021 correspondence with DPS, Holtec states: 

[T]he nuclear industry transfers used fuel assemblies from wet storage in the spent fuel pool to dry cask storage with the approval of the NRC after the fuel assemblies have cooled and as little as one (1) year after the used fuel assemblies have been removed from the reactor cavity. High temperature and high-burnup fuel assemblies do not present a technical challenge to the safe storage of fuel assemblies in wet or dry storage. Technological advances over the last decade has allowed the time fuel needs to be stored in wet storage to be reduced dramatically.

Thanks to the introduction of Metamic – HT baskets, which have 10x the conductivity of stainless steel and 3x that of carbon steel it allows better heat transfer within the helium-filled MPC’s. In addition, the fuel transferred and stored in each cask is a mix of spent fuel that maintains the heat load of each canister. Holtec, using reactor engineering experts, carefully develops a loading plan for each cask that optimizes fuel loading to not just meet the requirements but builds in conservatism that will ensure compliance for the cask with sufficient margin. Because of this technological advancement, our Oyster Creek facility was able to remove all fuel from the spent fuel pool with 2 ½ years of shutdown and our Pilgrim facility will complete that offload in December of 2021, in the same 2 ½ year timeline while ensuring safety and security of the fuel. The Indian Point spent fuel pools will be emptied and all casks loaded by the 4th quarter of 2023.

Dry cask storage is a completely passive method of storing spent fuel that is safe for people and the environment. Cask systems are designed to contain radiation, manage heat and prevent nuclear fission. They resist earthquakes, projectiles, tornadoes, floods, temperature extremes and other natural and humanmade scenarios. The heat generated by a loaded spent fuel cask is typically less than that given off by a home-heating system. The heat and radiation naturally decrease over time without the need for fans or pumps. The casks are under constant monitoring and surveillance.
 

What is Metamic and how does it work?
According to Holtec:
Metamic is an aluminum boron carbide metal matrix composite material that has a high cross section for neutron absorption. Metamic is also stable (i.e. – maintains its integrity) at higher temperatures than steel, allowing for more heat dissipation (generation) created from the decay of fission products. Metamic material does a better job of controlling higher temperatures than steel. Assisting with the cooling of the spent fuel is helium. The Multi-Purpose Canister is pressurized with Helium which transfers heat from the fuel assemblies to the shell of the MPC. The vents provided in the HI-Storm System then create a chimney effect (convection cooling) that removes the heat generated by the assemblies. The presence of Helium, which is an inert gas, also prevents oxidation and corrosion induced degradation of the spent fuel assemblies.

Holtec indicated it wants to transfer fuel out of the spent fuel pools at record pace. Are the rods being taken out of the pools too quickly, quicker than recommended?
Observing the proper protocols, using the proper equipment, and loading fuel in configurations and at temperatures verified to be safe, spent fuel is safer in dry cask storage than in a spent fuel pool.

Fuel transfer into storage casks is controlled by criteria in the Certificate of Compliance (COC) for NRC-approved casks.  The criteria cover three main fuel characteristics: enrichment, fuel burnup, and cooling time, with cooling time governing the allowable timing for transfer.  The minimum cooling time per NRC regulation is one year (see 10 CFR 72.2). One year is also the minimum cooling time specified in Amendment 15 of the COC for Holtec’s HI-STORM 100, which is the version referenced by Indian Point.  You can access the full COC for Holtec’s HI-STORM 100 cask at NRC’s website here:   https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/designs.html

To date, NRC has found Holtec in compliance with COC criteria. The transfer rate is faster than experienced at Maine Yankee but is consistent with the rates experienced at Vermont Yankee and San Onofre. In March 2022, Holtec received approval to upgrade the Davit crane in Unit 3 to facilitate faster spent fuel transfer. As spent fuel transfer proceeds, DPS staff continues to monitor the process and will notify the public if potential violations are identified or should Holtec seek additional changes to the currently approved spent fuel transfer process.

Is damaged fuel being transferred to dry cask storage? If so, is it a concern? What safeguards are in place to prevent it?
During the March 17, 2022 meeting of the DOB, Holtec stated “We are submitting an exemption request by early next week to allow us to cask damaged fuel that may contain a primary secondary source.”

Holtec filed that exemption request on March 24, 2022. Some of the specific fuel information is classified as proprietary and is not available to the State. Damaged fuel bundles and neutron source assemblies (NSAs) are only allowed to be placed in certain slots within the dry cask containers.  They are placed within special sleeves (known as inserts) to contain any loose or damaged parts or debris. Holtec’s exemption request asks NRC to increase the number of NSAs allowed in each cask.
 

Why is Holtec applying for an LAR/Exemption Request relating to the storage of damaged fuel?
According to Holtec:
The current safety evaluation for the casks allows for the casking of non-damaged fuel, non-damaged fuel with a secondary or primary source, and damaged fuel. (Damaged / Failed are the same here) What it doesn’t allow is the casking of damaged fuel that contains a source. Primary and secondary sources were used during reactor operation to initiate and control the fission process in the reactor. Due to compatibility issues of the sources with the existing fuel, these source do not fit in existing non-damaged fuel assemblies. There are 13 of these types of assemblies and as I stated at the meeting, these assemblies can not be casked with our current safety analysis associated with the HiStorm system, thus the need for the Exemption.

A fuel assembly can be classified as failed for reasons other than the breach of the cladding; these include assemblies that were not tested for failure due to its location in the spent fuel pool, inability to test due to interferences within the pool, a grid strap not in the correct position, etc., etc. In short, although we may classify a fuel assembly as failed, it does not necessarily mean that the zirconium cladding which contains the fuel pellets has been breached.

For casking purposes, an assembly noted as failed is placed in a Damaged Fuel Canister made of stainless steel, then inserted into the MPC thus affording the additional protection required.

Are dry casks tested in a fire scenario? Do they get damaged if knocked over due to a gas explosion?
According to the DOB’s independent technical expert Dave Lochbaum, “dry casks are designed and analyzed for numerous postulated challenges including explosions, fires, and tip-overs. Each cask design is subjected to tests to demonstrate that the computer models are accurate. As documented in the most recent Final Safety Analysis Report[6] for the Hi-Storm 100 casks like those used at Indian Point, the casks were subjected to, and withstood, tip-over, a fire accident, tornadoes, floods, and explosions, among a number of other accident scenarios.

Dry casks have also been evaluated for even more severe fire scenarios during transport. A report[7] by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) evaluated four “what if” fire events, including one scenario in which a shipment included dry casks. While none of these events were specific to onsite storage configurations, they involved high temperatures for long durations.

Bottom line - casks are robust. Spent fuel in dry casks is safer and more secure than fuel in spent fuel pools or reactor vessels.” 

How does Enbridge train first responders without providing training materials?
Enbridge indicated it provides mailing information packets to responders as required by PHMSA. This is complemented with liaison meetings either via an Enbridge employee or through the Paradigm meetings that Enbridge is a partner with neighboring pipeline companies. Additionally, Enbridge offers free, online training on pipeline response at www.emergencyresponderinfo.com.
 

How are other counties within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone incorporated in emergency preparedness planning and exercises?
Westchester, Putnam, Rockland, and Orange counties all participate in training and exercise activities for Indian Point.  Exercises, coordinated by New York State, provide an opportunity for all four counties to practice a coordinated response to a simulated emergency at Indian Point.
 

What happens if a 9-1-1 call is received by Rockland County?
If Rockland County receives a 911 call intended for Westchester County, that call is routed to Westchester County for further processing.
 

Do emergency instructions related to the gas pipelines and Indian Point conflict with one another?
No, the DOB has not seen language that reflects an unambiguous conflict as the question implies or suggests. In any event, according to Westchester County OEM, any threat to life safety would be addressed first, with first responders taking steps to evacuate those at the highest risk in the immediate area of a pipeline incident.  If there were an emergency at Indian Point, steps would then be taken to assess the situation and determine the required protective action (evacuate or shelter-in-place) in coordination with the local Incident Commander.
 

Does the “mutual aid” for fire response include a pipeline fire?
According to Westchester County OEM, the Fire Mutual Aid Plan covers countywide response to fires and other incidents. Its purpose is to provide a framework for Fire Departments to support one another during a major emergency.  Hazardous materials emergency response training is provided countywide to all Firefighting personnel, however training for pipeline emergencies has so far been targeted at those departments that may respond immediately to a pipeline incident.  Multiple fire departments participated in the most recent training/exercise activities conducted in cooperation with Enbridge and the County in July 2022 and September 2022.  

According to Enbridge, the company’s role in the event of a fire would be to assess the situation and protect the public, environment, and surrounding assets. Enbridge states it accomplishes that by finding the root cause of the fire and correcting the issue if possible at that time, isolating the fire, manipulating the system to starve the fire of fuel, then once the flames are extinguished continue to constantly monitor the situation until the area is deemed safe and make the necessary repairs to remediate. Further, Enbridge clarifies that any mutual aid agreements are between the local fire departments, county emergency management, and state agencies. Enbridge only considers mutual aid agreements between industry partners if a mutually beneficial agreement for response is requested. Enbridge currently does not have any mutual aid agreements in the area of Westchester and/or Rockland Counties. Any other information requests regarding mutual aid agreements between fire departments and their details regarding training can be directed to those fire departments or Westchester County OEM.

What alternate means of communication and evacuation do first responders have if door-to-door methods prove unsafe or otherwise unattainable?
According to Westchester County OEM, any threat to life safety would be addressed first, with first responders taking steps to evacuate those at the highest risk in the immediate area of a pipeline incident.  During the initial response this would primarily be a “door to door” evacuation.  Other methods of public alerting may include outbound calling, Wireless Emergency Alerts and/or the Emergency Alert System (EAS) depending on the scenario and the area to be notified.

­What pro-active steps did the DOB take to avoid the union issues that have plagued Holtec’s business at Oyster Creek?­
Members of the DOB, and the leaders of several local unions representing existing and former workers at Indian Point have been in regular communication since October 2021 on matters regarding current labor agreements with Holtec. When there have been disagreements, members of the DOB have convened parties in an effort to foster constructive dialogue, while respecting the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
 

What economic development is being explored to address the economic impact of the area surrounding Indian Point?
Economic development remains a focus of the Indian Point Closure Task Force. Through March 2022, the Task Force has already identified over $100 million in New York State grant funds available to the taxing jurisdictions directly affected by the closure of Indian Point. In addition, Governor Hochul recently directed $15 million in settlement funds toward five projects in the region for community and environmental benefit. The largest beneficiaries of the awards, the Village of Buchanan and Town of Cortlandt collectively received more than $6 million for wastewater treatment infrastructure to spur development of new business in the community.

Empire State Development, New York State’s economic development arm, remains in regular contact with local officials to discuss future redevelopment possibilities – both for surrounding parcels not vital to the decommissioning effort and for the Indian Point site once decommissioning activities are complete – and is prepared to support the development goals agreed to by the communities surrounding Indian Point.

Are there any available job retraining programs for former employees at Indian point, to retrain them on working with Solar or Wind energy equipment?

NYSDOL, in partnership with NYSERDA and other agencies is launching the Office of Just Energy Transition (OJET). This office will connect workers to opportunities for quality jobs, upskilling, and training with a focus on serving those who are traditionally underrepresented, especially within disadvantaged communities.

• The office is in the process of being set up and is engaging various stakeholders.
• Beginning next year, it’s anticipated this office will oversee a training fund of up to $25 million annually for workforce training and retraining programs to prepare workers for employment for work in the renewable energy field.
• Additional information can be found here: https://dol.ny.gov/office-just-energy-transition-ojet 

NYSERDA has dedicated more than $170 million in funding to support clean energy workforce development and training. 

• More information can be found here: https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Clean-Energy-Workforce-Development-and-Training 
• Current funding opportunities are listed here: https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/Funding-Opportunities/Current-Funding-Opportunities 

NYSDOL offers several training funds for programs

• Apprenticeship Expansion Grant for programs outside of building and construction trades
• Previous applications for existing employee training and unemployed and underemployed worker training closed on June 30, but are expected to launch in a new round in 2024.
• Funding opportunities are available here: https://dol.ny.gov/funding-opportunities-0  

Local Workforce Boards, which operate primarily on federal funds, are generally able to provide training assistance to individuals in the communities they serve through individual training accounts.

• Website and contact information for these boards are available here: https://dol.ny.gov/lwdbs  

SUNY Training: In addition to traditional degree programs available through SUNY, campuses also offer specific microcredentials in various fields.

• The complete list can be found here: https://www.suny.edu/microcredentials/

General

What monitoring does Enbridge perform on the three interstate pipelines near Indian Point? 
The AGT pipelines undergo multiple layers of monitoring to confirm integrity and security of the pipelines. In addition to remotely monitoring pressures on its pipelines traversing the Indian Point site on a continuous basis, Enbridge is required to perform a patrol of its pipelines four times each year per federal pipeline safety regulations.  During patrolling, Enbridge will look for surface conditions that could impact the pipeline, such as indications of ground movement, excavation, or construction activity, etc.  In accordance with its procedures, Enbridge performs patrols of the three pipeline segments in the vicinity of Indian Point on a far more frequent basis.  Federal pipeline safety regulations further require Enbridge to perform a gas leakage survey on its pipelines once each year. As part of Enbridge’s Transmission Integrity Management Program, it is also required to run inline inspection tools within all three pipelines in the vicinity of Indian Point every seven years.  The inline inspection tools provide data on the physical condition of the pipelines and alerts Enbridge to any features requiring attention. In addition to these direct monitoring activities, routine, code-mandated maintenance activities, primary valve inspections, and cathodic protection monitoring provide additional layers of monitoring activity to prevent, identify, and mitigate potential integrity and security issues.

DPS, as part of its interstate agent status, participated in a routine PHMSA system inspection of the AGT pipeline system in Fall 2021. As part of that inspection, DPS reviewed Enbridge’s records of patrolling and leakage surveys of these three pipelines for the preceding three years and verified the patrols and inspections described above were being performed.

Why is the pipeline able to operate near Indian Point when it appears the risk assessment may have been reverse engineered for federal approval?
The regulatory approvals required to operate an interstate gas pipeline fall solely within the jurisdiction of federal agencies. That said, this question appears to be referring to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report on NRC’s handling of the AIM pipeline approval, which on page 6 states: “When OIG briefed NRC managers on the issues OIG identified in the Physical Scientist’s analysis, one noted that because the Physical Scientist conducted multiple calculations with increasing credit for pipeline enhancements, it appeared to be backwards engineering to get a desired result.”

In response to this report, NRC assigned a team of scientists to look into the AIM pipeline approval. On April 8, 2020, the team issued a report, concluding: “even though Entergy (the plant owner) and the NRC made some optimistic assumptions in analyzing potential rupture of the 42-inch natural gas transmission pipeline, the Indian Point reactors remain safe.” The report further required additional analysis by former plant owner Entergy (which were completed in July 2020) and process improvements by NRC.

On December 16, 2022, the federal Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) released the Updated Safety Review and Assessment of Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines Adjacent to the Indian Point Site conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL Assessment). The ORNL Assessment is available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/oak-ridge-national-laboratory-updated-pipeline-safety-review-indian-point-site. A December 16, 2022 presentation by PHMSA highlighting key report findings may be found at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/phmsa-presentation-ornl-report-new-york-community-members.

If you were notified that a missile was headed to the pipeline, or there was some other imminent danger, and a fast decision had to be made to shut the gas, who would you contact to turn off the gas?
Matters of national security and defense are handled by the federal government’s Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, who would provide the appropriate intelligence briefings to the key entities involved. The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has primary oversight jurisdiction over interstate transmission pipelines. In the highly unlikely event that New York State’s Department of Public Service was somehow notified of an imminent missile threat before the United States Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, the Department would notify appropriate authorities. Gas safety personnel have the necessary contact information for the gas operator and PHMSA to inform them of verifiable information that could jeopardize the safe operation of gas infrastructure.

 

Oversight

What oversight is there? What accountability? 
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has primary oversight jurisdiction over interstate transmission pipelines. In accordance with DPS’ interstate agent agreement with PHMSA, the New York State Department of Public Service (DPS) performs and documents inspections of the operations and activities of the pipeline when scheduled by PHMSA. Currently, DPS Staff witnesses annual inspections of those remote-operated valves needed for emergency shutdown in the vicinity of Indian Point site. During the Indian Point decommissioning process, excavation in close proximity of the gas pipelines or heavy load crossings over the pipeline requires advance notification to DPS Staff in accordance with the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730. Additionally, all excavation in NYS is subject to the One Call damage prevention regulations found in 16 NYCRR Part 753.

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has primary oversight jurisdiction over nuclear energy facilities. NRC performs and documents inspections of the operations and activities of the nuclear facility. NRC further requires licensees to perform a safety analysis when modifications are made to a facility that affect design function, method of performing or controlling a function, or an evaluation that demonstrates intended functions will be accomplished.

How does PHMSA ensure integrity?
PHMSA has included Transmission Integrity Management regulations in 49 CFR Part 192 and New York State has adopted them into 16 NYCRR Part 255. These regulations prescribe minimum requirements for an integrity management program on any gas transmission pipeline. An operator’s integrity management program (IMP) requires the operator to identify all High Consequence Areas (HCAs), identify threats to each covered pipeline segment (which must include data integration and a risk Gas Pipeline Q&A assessment to perform a risk analysis), evaluate and assess these pipelines on a regular schedule, remediate conditions found during any integrity assessment, and implement preventive and mitigative measures for each covered segment.

PHSMA and DPS as the interstate agent for New York, perform regular audits of all Integrity Management Plans and the implementation of these plans. For interstate pipelines, enforcement actions are initiated by PHMSA when/if probable violations are identified during these audits.

NOTE: The “risk analysis” required by pipeline safety regulations deals with risks to the pipeline and helps prioritize the schedule of the assessment of pipeline and focuses efforts on measures that pipeline operators can (and must) take to prevent and mitigate the risks identified.

Who can make a decision to shut off the gas, such as by denying permits or issuing a corrective action order? 
Authorization for construction and operation of the Algonquin Incremental Management (AIM) pipeline is granted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

The Algonquin Gas Transmission (AGT) pipelines, with regard to compliance with federal pipeline safety regulations (49 CFR Part 192), are under the primary oversight of PHMSA.

At a recent meeting, you noted that DPS and PHMSA staff are making sure Holtec and Enbridge talk to one another. Why are you putting our safety in the hands of Holtec and Enbridge to decide what to do about stopping the gas? 
While Holtec and Enbridge are required to work within the scope of Indian Point’s decommissioning agreement in place (per the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730), NYS DPS has representation and input in regular meetings during the shutdown period to ensure procedures are followed. Enbridge, as the operator of the pipelines, and Holtec, as the owner of the site, are responsible for safety. PHMSA and NRC regulations require operators meet or exceed safety requirements. PHMSA and DPS, under an interstate agent agreement perform audits and inspections of Enbridge to ensure that these regulations are met. All enforcement is handled by PHMSA.

What proactive steps is DPS taking to manage pipeline safety when decommissioning work is being conducted near the pipeline?
DPS Staff has undertaken or will be undertaking the following proactive steps:

• DPS Staff is facilitating regular meetings with Holtec and AGT to ensure that both are aware of any construction on their facilities.
• Per the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730, Holtec is required to notify DPS Staff and the pipeline operator at least five business days in advance of any excavation that could affect the pipelines.
• Federal pipeline safety regulations and Company procedures require the pipeline operator to monitor excavation activities within or near its pipeline right-of-way. DPS Staff will contact the pipeline operator to ensure that it is taking appropriate actions in response to excavation activities or heavy crossings on its pipeline.
• In coordination with PHMSA, DPS performs inspections of pipeline operations and maintenance activities, with particular attention to the pipeline and remote operated valves in the vicinity of Indian Point.

Will PHMSA be asked to answer questions before the DOB? 
In its role as interstate agent, the NYS Department of Public Service gas pipeline safety staff regularly engage with the federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) on matters pertaining to pipeline safety, including to respond to questions raised with the Decommissioning Oversight Board (DOB). From time to time and as appropriate, the DOB may ask the appropriate federal regulatory bodies, including PHMSA, to participate in public and working group meetings of the DOB.

Risk Assessment

What is the purpose of a risk assessment? 
As part of a gas pipeline operator’s Integrity Management Program, an operator is required to undertake a process for the identification of threats to each “covered pipeline segment” (a segment of gas transmission pipeline located at a high consequence area – e.g., near Indian Point), which must include data integration and a risk assessment. An operator must use the threat identification and risk assessment to prioritize covered segments for assessment and to evaluate the merits of additional preventive and mitigative measures for each covered segment.

A gas pipeline operator must conduct a risk assessment per 49 CFR Part 192 and 16 NYCRR Part 255.901-951 that follows ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 5, and considers the identified threats for each covered segment. An operator must use the risk assessment to prioritize the covered segments for the baseline and continual reassessments, and to determine what additional preventive and mitigative measures are needed for the covered segment.

The purpose of a risk assessment is not to have zero risk, but to determine threats to the system and prioritize the taking of preventive and mitigative actions to minimize risk from identified threats, particularly those in pipeline segments that are in (or could directly affect) high consequence areas, such as Indian Point.

In instances of colocation with a nuclear energy facility, NRC further requires the licensee of that nuclear facility to perform a separate safety analysis. The scope of this safety analysis, as outlined and required by 10 CFR 50.59, is to assess the integrity of the nuclear facility and safe operations thereof.

Agency studies are violating the basic laws of science concerning gas pipeline rupture and associated forces that result in massive cratering, pipe shrapnelling and violate science associated with such releases. It appears that agencies are attempting to dismiss risk as low when gas pipeline rupture may drive a new facility to non-safe shutdown in a highly sensitive area. 
From the April 2020 NRC “Indian Point Expert Team Final Report”:

If a rupture occurred on the stretch of 42-inch pipeline near Indian Point, the nuclear power plant would remain protected. The plant’s safety systems are all far from the pipeline. They are two or more times the “potential impact radius” that the U.S. Department of Transportation designates for protecting people from pipeline ruptures and also far outside the distance where heat flux would be high enough to affect wooden structures, let alone the robust concrete structures that house the plant’s safety equipment. The potential impact radius bounds most pipe rupture impacts observed in real-life accidents. In a more detailed transient analysis, the team found that the robust concrete structures housing the plant’s safety-related equipment, spent fuel pool, and dry fuel storage containers would withstand the heat and pressure impacts of an explosion or fire that could follow a pipeline explosion. The safety related equipment would be able to safely shut down the reactors and maintain them in a safe shutdown condition. Equipment or structures outside these buildings could be affected, but these serve as backups or alternatives to the safety-related equipment. The team also conducted a risk assessment to consider the uncertainties of the events that could unfold at Indian Point and found that the risk of serious consequences from a postulated pipeline rupture was very small.

You can't quantify risk: There is no precedent for a pipeline (let alone 3) on the site of a nuclear plant or during its decommissioning. 
On March 9, 2020, NYS DPS sent a letter to FERC and NRC expressing a desire for a comprehensive and site-wide analysis of accident risks posed by all of the pipelines to the Indian Point facilities. In its May 27, 2020 response to DPS, NRC stated:

While the evaluation team primarily focused on the AIM pipeline efforts, there have been analyses of the two preexisting pipelines that cross the Indian Point site. These previous analyses concluded that the preexisting pipelines are unlikely to fail and that, if a rupture occurred, there are backup systems onsite at Indian Point that could safely shut down the reactors. In addition, the spent fuel would remain protected, whether it is in the plant’s spent fuel pools (which were also analyzed for the heat load of the spent fuel), or out of the pools and in the dry spent fuel storage casks.

While an additional site-specific analysis could address more factors such as site topography, weather, earthquake-initiated pipeline ruptures, and the capabilities of specific equipment and structures on site to withstand pipeline ruptures, the NRC staff has determined that it is unlikely that such an analysis would change the underlying findings of the prior reviews of the pipelines. Given that the risk posed by a potential pipeline rupture near Indian Point is low and is expected to decrease as the reactors transition to decommissioning within the next year, the NRC staff has concluded that conducting such an analysis is not warranted at this time.

The pipeline failure rate in the US has been most prominent in newly-constructed pipelines since 1986.
DPS Staff is aware of an industry trend of an increased number of reportable incidents on recently constructed pipelines.

The 42-inch pipeline took extra steps during construction and pre-energizing testing to remediate risk associated with construction defects. The enhanced protections for the pipeline adjacent to Indian Point include:

• A more stringent design factor, higher-grade pipe, and deeper burial than required
• Fusion-bonded epoxy coatings for corrosion control outside the pipe, an abrasive resistant overlay outside the pipe, and no coating on field weld joints that could cause pipe metal cracking, such as shrink sleeves or tape coatings
• 100-percent non-destructive examination of all girth welds; 100-percent inspection of all welding, coating, and backfilling activities; and pigging after construction to identify and remediate any dents exceeding code limitations
• Hydrostatic testing before placing the pipeline segment into natural gas service, at over 1.5 times MAOP for 8 hours
• Enbridge also placed fiber-reinforced concrete slabs and warning tape above the pipeline near Indian Point to reduce the likelihood of construction digging or other activities inadvertently reaching and damaging the pipeline.

In addition, an inline inspection of the 42-inch pipeline was performed in 2020.

NYS risk assessment said that decommissioning increases the risk of a pipeline rupture. Is that still a concern? 
The risk assessment commissioned by NYS did not specifically analyze decommissioning activities in relation to the pipelines within the Indian Point facility. However, the risk assessment did address certain threats associated with decommissioning activities, such as the outside force damage and excavation damage. The risk assessment did identify excavation damage as one of the higher risk threats posed to the pipeline. The risk assessment, however, assessed the risks in the context of general threats posed to a pipeline and also did not take into account actions to mitigate those threats. Mitigative measures include:

• The Indian Point facility is a highly controlled site where it would be highly improbable for third-party excavation to take place without prior knowledge and access of the facility owner.
• Excavation near pipelines must be conducted carefully following all protocols to prevent damage. The DPS is holding regular meetings with Holtec and AGT to ensure that both are aware of construction. All excavation activities must comply with 16 NYCRR Part 753 requirements such as – advance notification to Dig Safely New York, wait for mark outs, hand expose the pipe location, limitations on power equipment usage within tolerance zone and no usage of power equipment within 4 inches of the pipeline after identifying location, etc.
• Per the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730, Holtec is required to notify DPS Staff and the pipeline operator at least five business days in advance of any excavation that could affect the pipelines.

Were the questions raised by DPS to FERC ever answered? Does NYS still care about the answers to those questions? 
In 2021, PHMSA announced that Oak Ridge would conduct an independent review by Oak Ridge National Labs (ORNL). DPS, under its own separate authority (not in its role as a state agent of PHMSA), has shared and reiterated its perspective, and engaged with Senators Schumer, Gillibrand, and Representative Jones, who have raised the issue with Federal authorities.

On December 16, 2022, PHMSA released the Updated Safety Review and Assessment of Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines Adjacent to the Indian Point Site conducted by ORNL. The ORNL Assessment is available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/oak-ridge-national-laboratory-updated-pipeline-safety-review-indian-point-site. A December 16, 2022 presentation by PHMSA highlighting key report findings may be found at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/phmsa-presentation-ornl-report-new-york-community-members.

The pipeline poses a risk by being on two fault lines.
DPS Staff has confirmed that Enbridge has a seismic monitoring program in place in which it automatically receives earthquake notifications from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) GeoJSON and Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) RSS data feeds. These systems provide Enbridge with near real-time notifications of earthquakes in proximity to its pipelines. DPS Staff has confirmed that Enbridge has procedures in place to take appropriate actions in response to earthquakes near its pipelines.

In a letter sent to the NRC on March 26, 2020, NYS DPS, under its own separate authority (not in its role as a state agent of PHMSA) requested NRC conduct an overall site risk analysis including all three pipelines on the site and incorporating updated USGIS seismic information.

In Danville, KY there was a pipeline failure that resulted in a 30 ft. long pipeline section that landed 460 feet from failure site and left a 50 ft. long, 35 ft. wide and 13 ft. deep crater. How would that impact this site at Indian Point with the spent fuel and all the radioactive materials? Death of 1 person, hospitalization of 6 and destruction of homes. It was a 30" pipeline and AIM is a 42" diameter pipeline and there is also a 30" pipeline on this site.
The Danville, KY incident is under investigation by the federal National Transportation Safety Board; the NTSB is pending release of the final investigation report for this incident.

DPS Staff notes that the distances described by the commenter are within the calculated potential impact radius (PIR) of the 30-inch PIR of the Danville, KY. The April 8th, 2020 NRC Expert Evaluation Team report, which was informed utilizing a team of SMEs at NRC and PHMSA, states that double the calculated PIR of the 42-inch pipeline would not affect safety-related structures at the nuclear power plant.

On March 9, 2020, NYS DPS, under its own separate authority (not in its role as a state agent of PHMSA) sent a letter to FERC and NRC underscoring the value of a comprehensive and site-wide analysis of risks posed by pipelines at the Indian Point facilities.

3-Minute Drill

Why can't the gas be shut off if Enbridge missed the 3-minute drill the approval was based on? If a pipeline company lies to get a permit, who has the power to rectify it?
Authorization for construction and operation of the AIM pipeline was granted by FERC in 2015.

While FERC had primary responsibility for approval of the AIM pipeline construction, NRC advised FERC regarding the impact of the pipeline on the Indian Point facility. Under 10 CFR 50.59, former Indian Point facility owner, Entergy, was required to evaluate if additional risk would be posed to the nuclear facility by the construction of the new pipeline. Entergy's August 24, 2014 10 CFR 50.59 analysis utilized a 3-minute valve closure time for isolation of the pipeline in the event of a rupture to calculate whether critical nuclear safety structures would be affected. The NRC accepted this analysis by Entergy. Since the filing of the analysis, petitioners to the NRC noted that the 3-minute valve closure time was unrealistic, but the NRC rejected this petition.

On October 5, 2018 – NYS DPS witnessed Enbridge operate each of the five remote-operated valves that would be needed to isolate each of the three AGT pipelines (26-inch, 30-inch, and 42-inch line) that run near the Indian Point Power plant in Westchester County, NY. NYS DPS observed that, from the time the controller in the control room in Houston initiated the valve closure, the valve took approximately 30 seconds to close. This included the two remote-operated valves (ROVs) to isolate the 42-inch AIM pipeline near the Indian Point Property.

On October 9th and October 10th, 2019, NYS DPS performed a similar inspection to the one performed in October 2018, in which NYS DPS observed Enbridge operate the five ROVs needed to isolate the three pipelines in the Indian Point area. NYS DPS observed that each valve was operable remotely and was able to close in approximately 30 seconds.

On September 30th, 2020, NYS DPS performed a similar inspection to the one performed in October 2019, in which NYS DPS observed Enbridge operate the five ROVs needed to isolate the three pipelines in the Indian Point area. NYS DPS observed that each valve was operable remotely and was able to close in approximately 30 seconds.

To verify the 3-minute closure time, NYS DPS called for a control room drill observed by DPS and federal regulators. During the week of April 29, 2019, DPS Staff performed focused control room inspection of pipelines within Indian Point area (26-inch, 30-inch, and 42-inch pipeline). Staff focused on the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sensors in the area and actions a controller would take to close a valve. As part of this control room inspection, NYS DPS Staff travelled to Houston and observed the controller initiate a valve closure of one of the valves needed to isolate the 30-inch pipeline in the Indian Point area. At the same time, local NYS DPS Staff observed the actual closure of the valve in the field. Staff did not observe any issues with operation of the ROV and confirmed that the ROV took approximately 30 seconds to close from initiation. However, DPS staff also observed that the valve closure times would likely exceed 3 minutes due to the time it would take for on-site verification of an incident.

The NRC Office of Inspector General, in its report issued on February 13, 2020, noted concerns regarding the usage of the 3-minute valve closure time in the NRC's analysis. The NRC issued its expert evaluation team report, in response to the OIG findings, on April 8th, 2020. In the response report, the NRC confirmed that 3-minutes would be a "best-case scenario" for identification and closure of remote-operated valves, and remote valve closure would likely take 3 to 8 minutes.

DPS Staff believes the NRC's expert evaluation team report resolves outstanding concerns regarding the 3-minute valve closure time. The revised Entergy 10 CFR 50.59 analysis, submitted on September 16, 2020, uses a valve closure time of 8 minutes. The revised analysis found that there would be no damage to site structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from a pipeline rupture; the NRC accepted Entergy's revised 10 CFR 50.59 with no findings.

Most damage after a rupture would be done within a few minutes.
DPS Staff does not disagree with this statement, but notes the number of aforementioned actions taken by DPS Staff to verify the steps taken by Enbridge during the construction and operations of these pipelines to mitigate risk of leaks or damage to prevent a rupture on the pipeline.

The time to shut the remote valves from Houston doesn't include the time to identify a pipeline rupture which can take at least 30 minutes and up to hours. None of the 900+ incidents reported to PHMSA were shut in less than 30 minutes.
Staff has reviewed the list of 920 incidents reported to PHMSA. The list primarily consists of events that did not lead to a pipeline rupture. Only 118 of the 920 listed incidents were on transmission piping, of which 23 were shutdown within 30 minutes and another 26 where the pipeline did not need to be shutdown at all. Ultimately, it is not possible to infer a shutdown time for the AIM pipeline based on the list of PHMSA reportable incidents.

In the unlikely event of an incident on the AGT pipelines within the Indian Point area, the pipelines have the following that leave them well-positioned to be shut within 30 minutes:

• Gas flow the pipelines can be isolated via remote-operated valves that can be initialized from Enbridge's control room, so time is needed for qualified personnel to travel to individual valves can be eliminated. DPS Staff has verified valves close within 30 seconds of initialization by the controller. Valves necessary for isolation have been pre-identified and are inspected at least once annually for operability.
• DPS Staff has verified that there are multiple SCADA sensors near the area that would alert Enbridge controllers to a pressure drop on the pipeline.
• All pipelines are downstream of the nearby the Stony Point Compressor Station; the high discharge alarms would provide an initial alert to controllers of a rupture condition on the pipeline.

At the NRC Petition Review Board hearing on July 15, 2015, Richard Kuprewicz raised concerns about the potential impact radius of a pipeline rupture near Indian Point:
PHMSA accident data suggests that the potential impact radius (PIR) near Indian Point is more than adequate, given critical systems at Indian Point are twice the PIR. As part of the investigation for its report, the NRC expert evaluation team interviewed Richard Kuprewicz on March 19, 2020.

From the “Indian Point Expert Team Final Report”:

If a rupture occurred on the stretch of 42-inch pipeline near Indian Point, the nuclear power plant would remain protected. The plant’s safety systems are all far from the pipeline. They are two or more times the “potential impact radius” that the U.S. Department of Transportation designates for protecting people from pipeline ruptures and also far outside the distance where heat flux would be high enough to affect wooden structures, let alone the robust concrete structures that house the plant’s safety equipment. The potential impact radius bounds most pipe rupture impacts observed in real-life accidents. In a more detailed transient analysis, the team found that the robust concrete structures housing the plant’s safety-related equipment, spent fuel pool, and dry fuel storage containers would withstand the heat and pressure impacts of an explosion or fire that could follow a pipeline explosion. The safety related equipment would be able to safely shut down the reactors and maintain them in a safe shutdown condition. Equipment or structures outside these buildings could be affected, but these serve as backups or alternatives to the safety-related equipment. The team also conducted a risk assessment to consider the uncertainties of the events that could unfold at Indian Point and found that the risk of serious consequences from a postulated pipeline rupture was very small.

Entergy, Indian Point’s previous owner, and the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission also evaluated theoretical impacts that might be posed by an accident on a legacy line; they concluded that the IP3 reactor and spent fuel building would not be adversely impacted. See NRC Report, Enclosure 2 (dated May 27, 2020) at 6-10.

Decommissioning

Why aren’t pipelines mentioned in Holtec’s PSDAR?
Recognizing that the Holtec PSDAR filed in December 2019 does not address the gas pipelines traversing the Indian Point site, NYS is using its regulatory and oversight authority to rectify this omission.  The Joint Proposal reached between New York State and Holtec in April 2021 acknowledges the colocation of gas pipelines with Indian Point and requires bolstered communication and advanced notice to key state agencies prior to excavation and heavy load crossings. In a government-to-government meeting with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 29, 2021 regarding the Holtec PSDAR, NYS DPS emphasized the need for the gas pipelines on the site to be protected during decommissioning.  Members of the public provided similar feedback to the NRC during public meetings on the Holtec PSDAR on July 29, 2021 and August 18, 2021. In addition, NYS DPS, through the New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, requested that Holtec incorporate pipeline incident preparedness in its Indian Point Decommissioning Plan for Fire Protection Program. DPS has coordinated information exchange between Enbridge and Holtec to formalize and document exact locations of the pipelines on site, integrity test results on the pipelines, maximum load thresholds for the pipelines, and appropriate mitigation measures.

What is the weight rating of the steel plates Holtec uses for heavy load transfers?
According to Holtec, the steel plates used for a bridge on the roadway of the IP site for heavy load transfers are like those used for typical road work projects and are consistent with steel plates that have been previously used at Indian Point for other heavy load transfers. The plating configuration that was reviewed and accepted by Enbridge for the movement of a main transformer several years ago allowed for transport of a 567,000-pound load on a multi-axle transport trailer. The same steel plate configuration is installed at the site today, and no heavy load crossings are planned that would exceed this load.

The Department of Public Service asked Holtec to formally confirm the specified weight rating of the plates used for heavy load transfers.  The Department also asked Holtec to confirm with Enbridge that the bridge created by the steel plates remains a technically acceptable approach that would mitigate risk to the pipeline(s) from any actual/anticipated heavy load crossings over the pipeline(s). Holtec has informed DPS that Enbridge conducted a field visit and confirmed the current steel plate bridge configuration is sufficient for the heaviest loads Holtec may transfer over the pipeline(s).

What constitutes a “heavy load” crossing? Or what is the expected range of weights of a loaded decommissioning vehicle? Does Holtec have site-specific guidance/ procedures for the movements of heavy loads on the Indian Point site?
According to Holtec, Indian Point is using the most limiting condition previously seen on site, which was movement of a main transformer weighing over 567,000 pounds. This work was performed in 2012 and in 2015. At that time, the steel plate bridge configuration utilized for the heavy load crossing was reviewed and approved by the pipeline owner and operator. The roadway plating design that was utilized for the 2012 and 2015 main transformer work is currently being implemented as a conservative measure. Holtec is communicating with Enbridge and the Department of Public Service to evaluate if additional actions are warranted.

At the request of the Department of Public Service (DPS), Enbridge supplied DPS and Holtec with maximum surface loading capacities and other key measurements to more formally document what loads may be safely transported over the existing pipeline infrastructure during the decommissioning process.  DPS has requested from Holtec its site-specific guidance and procedures to protect the on-site pipelines if it must take loads greater than those maximum capacities over the pipeline.  The Department has also required Holtec to formally notify Enbridge and the Department of Public Service 5 days prior to any heavy load crossing of the pipeline and receive formal confirmation from Enbridge that such crossings can safely occur with appropriate mitigation measures. The Department has requested that Enbridge formally confirm that the bridge created by the steel plates would be a technically acceptable and protective approach that would mitigate risk to the pipeline(s) from any actual/anticipated heavy load crossings over the pipeline. Holtec, Enbridge and DPS have quarterly coordination meetings where these matters are regularly discussed and any issues of concern are addressed.

What is the possibility that other contaminated material will traverse the gas pipeline?
Holtec is actively packaging and shipping low level waste from the Indian Point site as a part of the decommissioning process. Regardless of the material being transported, the April 2020 Joint Proposal between Holtec and the Department of Public Service requires Holtec to provide advanced notification to Enbridge and New York State of any heavy load crossing to ensure maximum load thresholds are never exceeded.

Why is Holtec showing the NRC where the pipeline is and not a PSC staff member interacting with NRC to ensure NRC understands?
DPS interacts with Holtec and NRC to facilitate critical information sharing, including on the interstate gas pipelines. Over the last several years, DPS delivered numerous communications to NRC and other relevant federal agencies regarding the interstate gas pipelines and the risk analyses related to their safe operation.

As the federally licensed operator of Indian Point, it is appropriate for Holtec to be in regular communication with NRC on all matters pertaining to the safe transfer of spent fuel and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including on matters related to the colocation of critical pipeline infrastructure on or near the Indian Point site.

Were pipelines put near Fort St. Vrain before or after decommissioning?
Pipelines were put in operation both before and after decommissioning of the Fort St. Vrain nuclear power station.  The federal Atomic Energy Commission authorized Fort St. Vrain  to operate in December 1973. In 1974, a 16-inch natural gas pipeline was installed that crossed a corner of the plant property, with a closest point 0.9 miles from the reactor building. Twelve natural gas wells were drilled on the site between 1981 and 1983, the closest well being 1,524 feet from the reactor building. In late 1987, a natural gas well was drilled 1,184 feet from the reactor building. Its pipeline passed within 560 feet of the switchyard. The plant ceased operations in 1989 and was decommissioned in 1992. The owner re-powered the site with three natural gas combustion turbines, with two more added later on. The natural gas supply is via a 12-inch pipeline passing within 1,400 feet of the dry storage facility.

­What is the subsurface concrete structure Enbridge plans to build [related to the gas pipelines]? What state or Federal agencies need to sign off on these modifications?­
According to a statement by Enbridge in 2022, the pipeline operator is exploring the installation of a concrete bridging slab, which would be installed in the soil between the existing roadway and the pipeline on the Indian Point site.  Plans for the bridging slab are tentative and preliminary.  The pipeline operator is also exploring other options such as replacement of the section of 26-inch pipe directly under the roadway.  The bridging slab may require environmental permitting approvals.  Enbridge would coordinate with Holtec for any such work it performs.

When did Indian Point establish a direct line with Enbridge? 
Following the Department of Public Service’s involvement in the pipeline risk assessment at Indian Point, which was completed in June 2018, DPS took a number of state actions that staff believes to be common-sense approaches to reduce the risk profile at the site. These actions included ensuring that strong communications channels existed between then-owner and operator Entergy and Enbridge. Following the sale to Holtec, DPS continued those efforts. Specifically:

• On August 9, 2018, DPS received written confirmation from Indian Point (Entergy) that they had Enbridge control room contact info in the Indian Point Control Room. Entergy included in their written confirmation to the DPS a copy of the Control Room Emergency Notification Binder demonstrating to the DPS that Enbridge’s accurate contact information was included in their Control Room Emergency Notification Binder.
• In October 2018, DPS Staff performed a field audit of Enbridge control valves, during which time it confirmed that Enbridge’s local field crews have the correct contact information for the IP control room. 
• In May 2019, during an onsite visit to Indian Point, DPS Staff asked Entergy’s Indian Point control room operators to show them the exact location of the Enbridge point of contact.  Entergy operators demonstrated to the DPS Staff they knew where to find this number, located in the Emergency Notification Binder. 
• Also in May 2019, as part of the DPS’s audit of Enbridge’s control room in Houston, Enbridge committed to adding Indian Point Control Room phone numbers to their list of “speed dial” numbers. DPS noted at the time that the Enbridge field crews already had this contact information, and the local field crews were the more likely entity to use it. DPS staff determined that for additional safety benefit it was important that the Enbridge control room also have the IP control room contact information, and Enbridge agreed to and enacted this recommendation.
• On August 1, 2021, during an onsite visit to Indian Point, DPS Staff asked Holtec’s Indian Point control room operators to show them the exact location of the Enbridge point of contact.  Holtec operators demonstrated to the DPS Staff they knew where to find this number, located in the Emergency Notification Binder. 
• On an ongoing basis, the DPS facilitates quarterly meetings between Holtec and Enbridge where DPS continues to stress the importance of maintaining current contact information and coordinating any significant activities at or near the IP site.

­When was an air bridge installed over the pipelines? 
According to Holtec:

During initial conversations, Holtec was informed by Enbridge that there were no immediate safety concerns with our usage of the roadway. However, Holtec took the pre-emptive action to install a steel plate air bridge while we collaborate with Enbridge on the long-term protection of the pipeline configuration. The plates were installed in January 2022.

Enbridge had previously approved the plates for prior Entergy heavy load crossings over the pipeline in 2012 and 2015.  In 2022, Holtec and Enbridge signed a formal memorandum of understanding stating that Enbridge had confirmed the pipelines and steel air bridge is sufficient for normal decommissioning loads over the pipeline.  The memorandum of understanding also requires Holtec to notify and receive an affirmative response from Enbridge of any heavy load crossings over the pipeline.

Can Enbridge or Holtec produce the engineering report that shows the ‘tack welded’ plates over the pipeline are sufficient?­
Due to the sensitive nature of the critical infrastructure in the area, engineering calculations associated with loads over the pipeline are not being shared with the public.  Engineering calculations performed by Enbridge show that the steel plates in their current configuration and as constructed are sufficient for anticipated loads over the pipeline.  Enbridge and Holtec signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) confirming that the plates are sufficient to accommodate the weights of normal heavy load crossings (including a specified weight limit) occurring on a regular basis without impacting the integrity of the 26” and 30” pipelines. The MOU specifies that Holtec must provide Enbridge with five day written advance notice of any loads that could exceed these normal heavy load crossings (or any significant decommissioning activities that could impact pipelines) and Enbridge must affirmatively respond in writing that such activity will not jeopardize the safety of the pipeline or identify what mitigation measures will be needed to protect the pipelines.

Mr. Kuprewicz recommended single points of contact between Enbridge and Holtec. Who are those points of contact and who are next in command?
The written MOU between Enbridge and Holtec specifies single points of contact at both companies.

What guarantee is there that Enbridge will continue to engage?­
Though the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) has primary jurisdiction of interstate pipelines with regard to the federal pipeline safety regulations, DPS Pipeline Safety has been delegated certain regulatory oversight functions as a result of its interstate agent status.  While DPS has thus far received Enbridge’s cooperation in addressing concerns relating to Enbridge’s transmission pipelines traversing the Indian Point site, failing that cooperation, Enbridge would be obligated to respond to DPS’s requests for pipeline safety information due to this delegated oversight authority.

In addition, DPS can use other regulatory avenues available to it to seek Enbridge’s cooperation in addressing concerns relating to the pipelines within the Indian Point site.  For example, by participating in Enbridge’s 2020 FERC Rate Filing, DPS secured Enbridge’s commitment to provide $530,000 in funding for the Verplanck Fire Department.

When will the pipeline right-of-way where heavy decommissioning activities are conducted at Indian Point be properly marked?
Significant attention has been focused on addressing safety and security concerns related to the co-location of interstate natural gas pipelines near the Indian Point facilities. Such actions have included, in part: (1) formalized, regular communication between decommissioning entity Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) and pipeline operator Enbridge, as required by joint agreement with the Department of Public Service; (2) clear marking of the pipeline over roadways on site; (3) installation of an air bridge to physically protect the pipe during any heavy load crossings; and (4) establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between HDI and Enbridge establishing communication, notification, and safety protocols regarding heavy pipeline crossings or any work that could affect the pipelines. While the pipeline right-of-way on site is visible and includes markings consistent with federal pipeline safety regulations and Enbridge procedures, enhancing pipeline markings on the Indian Point property is a reasonable request we extended to Enbridge. To further enhance visibility and awareness of the pipelines, Enbridge installed additional pipeline markers between the current markers within the site.

Gas Shutdown During Decommissioning

Why don’t you shut down the gas during decommissioning? Radioactive material is less protected during decommissioning, and thus more at risk of pipeline rupture. 
There is no change in how radioactive material is handled/protected on an operating site versus a site undergoing decommissioning.

Heavy excavation work related to decommissioning will further jeopardize pipeline integrity.
Per the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730, Holtec is required to notify DPS Staff and the pipeline operator five business days in advance of any excavation that could affect the pipelines. In addition, Holtec is required to notify DPS Staff and the pipeline operator 10 days in advance in the event of blasting or dredging at the site. Holtec states that it currently has no plans to perform blasting as part of decommissioning.

Federal pipeline safety regulations and Enbridge procedures require the pipeline operator to monitor excavation activities within or near its pipeline right-of-way. In addition, DPS Staff will contact the pipeline operator to ensure that it is taking appropriate actions in response to excavation activities or heavy crossings on its pipeline.

NYS confirmed that excavation near the pipeline heightens the risk of a pipeline rupture. 
The Executive Summary of the risk assessment commissioned by New York State in 2018 identified excavation as one of the higher risks to the pipelines at the Indian Point site. The risk assessment commissioned by New York State characterized general risks to the pipeline, but did not take into account mitigative measures to reduce those risks and certain site-specific requirements/conditions that greatly reduce the threat of excavation damage at the site. Mitigative measures include:

• A more stringent design factor, higher-grade pipe, and deeper burial than required
• Fusion-bonded epoxy coatings for corrosion control outside the pipe, an abrasive resistant overlay outside the pipe, and no coating on field weld joints that could cause pipe metal cracking, such as shrink sleeves or tape coatings
• 100-percent non-destructive examination of all girth welds; 100-percent inspection of all welding, coating, and backfilling activities; and pigging after construction to identify and remediate any dents exceeding code limitations
• Hydrostatic testing before placing the pipeline segment into natural gas service, at over 1.5 times MAOP for 8 hours
• Enbridge also placed fiber-reinforced concrete slabs and warning tape above the pipeline near Indian Point to reduce the likelihood of construction digging or other activities inadvertently reaching and damaging the pipeline.
• The Indian Point facility is a highly controlled site where it would be highly improbable for third-party excavation to take place without prior knowledge and access of the facility owner.
• Excavation near pipelines must be conducted carefully following all protocols to prevent damage. DPS is holding regular meetings with Holtec and AGT to ensure that both are aware of any construction activities near the pipelines.
• Per the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730, Holtec is required to notify DPS Staff and the pipeline operator five business days in advance of any excavation that could affect the pipelines.
• Federal pipeline safety regulations and Enbridge procedures require the pipeline operator to monitor excavation activities within or near its pipeline right-of-way.
• Increased DPS inspection activity in the area of Indian Point, including DPS Staff witnessing inspections of remotely operated valves that affect all three natural gas pipelines near Indian Point, control center audits verifying the ability to remotely operate valves in the vicinity of Indian Point, etc.
• Staff witnessed the IMP digs/inspection/repairs completed on Enbridge pipelines near Indian Point during the summer of 2021 and ensured excavation requirements were followed.
• Additionally, all excavation work is required to follow New York State's one call notification laws.

How has no decision been made on shutting down the pipeline during excavation? PSC must submit notification to PHMSA to issue a corrective action order to shut down the pipelines at Indian Point before demolition begins. Federal regulations outline the requirement pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112 to issue a Corrective Action Order "to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards."
PHMSA has primary jurisdiction of interstate pipelines. PHMSA has delegated to the Department of Public Service certain regulatory oversight functions, but PHMSA retains full enforcement authority. DPS works in coordination with PHMSA to discuss audit and inspection scheduling, documentation, and findings.

Based on inspections conducted of Enbridge in conjunction with PHMSA from 2015 to the present, DPS pipeline safety staff does not believe that a notification to PHMSA is warranted at this time. DPS Staff notes that representatives from PHMSA have been apprised and/or involved in the ongoing inspections and assessments of the pipelines, including the Indian Point Decommissioning Board Meeting on June 23rd, 2021 and as part of the NRC's expert evaluation team on concerns pertaining to the gas transmission lines near the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant.

To prevent and mitigate any risk of damage to the gas pipelines during decommissioning activities, DPS Staff notes the following mitigative measures have been undertaken:

• DPS Staff is facilitating regular meetings with Holtec and Enbridge to ensure that both are aware of any construction on their facilities.
• Per the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730, Holtec is required to notify DPS Staff and the pipeline operator five business days in advance of any excavation that could affect the pipelines.
• Federal pipeline safety regulations and Enbridge procedures require the pipeline operator to monitor excavation activities within or near its pipeline right-of-way.

DPS Staff will continue to contact the pipeline operator to ensure that it is taking appropriate actions in response to excavation activities or heavy crossings on its pipeline.

Holtec caused a power outage near Oyster Creek hitting a visible utility pole. What's going to happen with a buried gas pipeline?
The Oyster Creek event was not excavation damage, rather a Holtec construction vehicle that came into contact and knocked down a utility pole.

To prevent against excavation damage, if Holtec performs excavation near the pipelines, Holtec would be required to follow New York State's "Protection of Underground Facilities" regulation 16 NYCRR Part 753. This regulation requires safe excavation practices such as one-call notification to facility operators in the area and hand digging to verify underground facilities. In addition, per the Joint Proposal in Case 19-E-0730, Holtec is required to notify DPS Staff and the pipeline operator five business days in advance of any excavation that could affect the pipelines.

Federal pipeline safety regulations and AGT's procedures require the pipeline operator to monitor excavation activities within or near its pipeline right-of-way (ROW), participate in a one call system and mark out all facilities located within a proposed excavation area. Additionally, pipeline operators are required to install (and maintain) above ground pipeline markers along pipeline ROWs as required by 49 CFR Part 192.707. These markers alert the public, including excavators, that a buried pipeline is nearby.

On construction, demolition and/or excavation jobs, the first thing that’s done is to SHUT OFF THE GAS. The PSC must submit Notification to PHMSA to issue a Corrective Action Order to shut the pipelines at Indian Point.
The requirements are to shut off gas connections directly to the building getting demolished. Buildings within the Indian Point facility do not have connections to natural gas pipelines, either from the AGT pipelines or from local gas distribution mains.

Are there any emergency shut off valves at Indian Point to isolate it in the event of a rupture (on any of their 3 pipelines on the property)?
Yes. There are remote-operated valves that are able to isolate gas flow to all three pipelines traversing the Indian Point site.
 

The question does not identify the other pipeline safety experts, the nature of such statements, or when statements were made. DPS Staff interprets that the question seeks to refer to the Stony Point Compressor Station, which is upstream to the three pipelines traversing the Indian Point site. According to Enbridge, the estimated isolation time of the pipelines (3 to 8 minutes) includes isolation of the Stony Point Compressor Station (Stony Point). In addition, Stony Point provides valuable monitoring that would provide notice of an emergency on the pipelines to pipeline operators. Stony Point, like any other compressor station on Enbridge’s system, contains devices and automated processes that monitor various parameters of station and pipeline conditions and will display abnormal operating situations if present.

New England Gas Supply

Who needs the gas in New England? Why does it matter? 
Several natural gas fueled electric generators have contracts for capacity on the AIM pipeline, as well as the local gas distribution companies such as National Grid.

The people on the other end of the pipeline do not need this particular gas…the Massachusetts Attorney General said they don't need this gas…Weymouth compressor station ships LNG to Canada and Weymouth opposes AIM too. 
While there are liquefied natural gas facilities on the coast in New England, none have the capability to liquefy. They are receipt facilities for LNG that is received via tanker from other countries.

Gas shortages are designed to jack up prices.
Natural gas prices are established through trading at multiple trading points across the country. Natural gas markets are regional as pipelines generally travel across multiple states. Prices are set for day ahead trading and for longer term contracts. As there are multiple trading counter parties at each trading point, there is no opportunity for one individual purchaser, State or pipeline to cause price increases. Information on natural gas prices is publicly available through many sources.

Wouldn’t New England gas customers want their energy sourced differently if they knew the risks posed by the pipeline?
We cannot speculate on what New England residents would want, only state what they currently use. According to the federal Energy Information Administration, 65% of New England's electricity is currently generated by burning natural gas. As of July 13, 2021, natural gas prices for delivery on the Algonquin Pipeline were 27 cents per dekatherm cheaper than the Henry Hub natural gas trading point in Louisiana, meaning natural gas is an economic alternative in New England. Please refer to https://www.eia.gov/dashboard/newengland/overview.

Pipeline Integrity Management Work

At the June 25, 2021 DOB meeting, PHMSA notified the DOB of pipeline repair work planned by Enbridge in the vicinity of Indian Point and commencing in October 2021. The following questions are in relation to that work.
 

Why wasn’t the public notified of the repair work before work commenced?
The public was notified of the pipeline work planned by Enbridge at the June 25, 2021 DOB meeting. Additionally, pipeline owner and operator Enbridge notified local officials and public safety bodies, including New York State Police, Westchester County Emergency Services (Police & Fire), and the Village of Buchanan Police Department. Holtec and Con Edison were notified as well. NYS DPS identified opportunities for better communication and advised Enbridge to make improvements moving forward.

As a body committed above all else to a safe decommissioning, the DOB must balance public awareness with the need to protect critical infrastructure. From a security standpoint it will not always be advisable to advertise sensitive work on critical infrastructure – that is not in any way to avoid transparency with the public; it is to protect the public.

Why is a 26-inch pipeline being used as a backup for a 30-inch pipeline?
The 26-inch pipeline serves the same gas system as the 30-inch line and provides reliability in the event of maintenance on the 30-inch or 42-inch pipeline.  Note that, since the completion of the 42-inch pipeline in 2017, the 26-inch pipeline has and continues to be isolated from gas flow but is pressurized with low pressure gas (it is not ‘abandoned’).

Was the 30-inch pipeline depressurized during repair work of the 26” line conducted in the fall of 2021?

Since the 30-inch pipeline is 13 feet away from the 26-inch pipeline, was not exposed, and thus was not under any more significant threat of being compromised during work on the 26-inch line, it was not depressurized.

Why was the excavation site left unguarded (no security, no police) despite the proximity to Indian Point? Why did nothing happen until we contacted elected officials? Does New York State have any concerns with an unguarded pipeline?
Security was required during active work, per Village of Buchanan requirements. However, as there was no gas in the pipeline, the appropriate safety standards and procedures were observed, and the proper signage and protective barriers were in place to prevent individuals and/or vehicles from falling into the excavation, the Village of Buchanan permit conditions did not require security when there was no active work on the pipeline.

Numerous excavation safety protocols, procedures, and protective barriers are required for an open excavation to protect against security threats, this repair work being no exception. For instance, in addition to the measures described above, the pipeline operator was required to inspect the pipeline prior to backfilling to confirm integrity of the pipeline – a process that was observed by DPS staff.  These inspections would detect integrity issues, including but not limited to coating damage, and serve as a backstop against the unlikely threat of tampering.

Where and when is the methane gas vented before work commences on a line? Was the public alerted about the release? 
The 26-inch pipeline was vented down to 0 psig gas pressure on October 19th.  Prior to the blowdown, the pipeline was not flowing gas and was at minimal gas pressure (18 psig).  The blowdown occurred at AGT’s facilities on the east side of the Hudson River near the Indian Point site.  The following entities were notified: New York State Police, Westchester County Emergency Services (Police & Fire), Village of Buchanan Police Department, Holtec, and Con Edison.

Did Enbridge communicate with Holtec about the planned work?
Enbridge provided notice to Entergy on May 24th of the work and held a conference call on May 25th.   There was email correspondence between Holtec and Enbridge on September 21, September 23rd, and September 30th, 2021 on the planned work.  Holtec was kept continuously apprised of the work. That said, DPS will continue to encourage and facilitate maximum communication between Holtec and Enbridge.
 

What is the tensile strength of steel plates used to traverse pipelines over an open excavation?
Per NYS Department of Transportation (DOT), the load capacity of these steel plates is a function of the steel tensile strength, plate thickness, trench width (if applicable), axle spacing, load distribution, and soil condition.

The steel plates used by pipeline operator AGT during the work conducted at the pipeline intersection with Broadway in October 2021 are rated for AASHTO HS20-44 loading and in compliance with relevant Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements.  According to the specification, in the case of a semitrailer truck, the maximum loading for the first axle is 8,000 pounds; the maximum loading for a second axle 14 feet away is 32,000 pounds, and the maximum loading for a single-axle semitrailer 14-30 ft away from the second axle is 32,000 pounds.  Any vehicle in compliance with the legal load for the roadway would not have exceeded the weight limit of the steel plates. On 10/25/21, members of the public sent a photo of what is stated to be a Holtec truck over the roadway plates - the rated loading of the plates far exceeds the loaded weight of the truck shown in the photo.

Are there measures in place to prevent excessive loads from traveling on a roadway? 
Yes. There are numerous local, state, and federal regulations in place to prevent excessive loads from traveling on roadways in New York State. In addition, permitting and notification processes are in place to ensure hauls exceeding legal load are routed on the safest roads and using the most appropriate additional safeguards, including escort vehicles. Businesses and holders of commercial driver’s licenses are required to understand these regulations and processes in order to conduct business in New York State.

­What is the nature of the pipeline integrity management work that needs to be done? What is wrong with the pipeline?­
The planned pipeline integrity work will connect the 24” auxiliary pipeline crossing the Hudson River to the 26” pipeline traversing the Indian Point site.  The work is expected to take place from early April into June.  The work is to allow the passage of inline inspection tools and inline cleaning tools.  Previous assessments of the pipeline had to be performed using tethered inspection tools; this work will allow the passage of more traditional (although more advanced) inline inspection tools through the 24” pipeline.

­
What is the volume of gas that will be vented to work on the pipeline? Will the community be notified of the release?­
Venting of the 24-inch and 26-inch pipelines took place in Rockland County, across the Hudson River and approximately 1.5 miles from Indian Point. The volume of gas released was approximately 190,000 standard cubic feet (SCF).  Enbridge notified the following public entities in advance of the planned venting activities: DEC, DHSES, New York State Police, Orange and Rockland Utilities, Rockland County Fire and Hazmat, Rockland County Department of Health, Stony Point Police Department, Stony Point Fire Department, Holtec, Verplanck Fire Department, and Westchester County Emergency Services.

Yorktown Sink Hole

Why was Enbridge “made aware” of the sink hole rather than discovering it on their own? If nobody noticed, how long would it have taken for the company to find it?
According to Enbridge, sink holes can rapidly appear without warning. If the sink hole had not been discovered on December 24, 2022, it is likely that the sink hole would have been identified during the next scheduled patrol.
Consistent with federal pipeline safety regulations, Enbridge is required to perform a patrol of its pipelines four times each year.  Per its procedures, Enbridge performs patrols of its pipeline on a far more frequent basis.  While the frequency may not be disclosed due to critical infrastructure security concerns, DPS staff can confirm it would have allowed Enbridge to discover the condition soon after it occurred.
 

Have potential subsidence issues been evaluated at/near Indian Point? 
According to Enbridge, the Indian Point area has been assessed for land movement and flooding hazards, and no geohazards or pipe movement features affecting girth welds or pipeline integrity were identified. No sink holes or other subsidence features have been identified through ground-based or aerial LiDAR-based inspections within the Enbridge right-of-way adjacent of the Indian Point facility.

Has Holtec discussed potential cyber-attacks with Enbridge and PSC? Especially in light of Russian attacks on nuclear power facilities.
Indian Point and the interstate transmission pipelines near Indian Point are under the auspices of separate federal government cyber security regulations.

The systems and equipment responsible for the safe storage, handing, and cooling of all spent nuclear fuel at the Indian Point site are disconnected from any other network connections.  This security measure creates a nearly impenetrable cyber barrier between Indian Point’s spent fuel and malicious actors. The Cyber Security Rule, as contained in 10 CFR 73.54, applies to licensees currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant. NRC staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1). However, Holtec indicated its Cyber Security Plan (CSP) at Indian Point will be maintained until the license condition is removed from the site’s operating licenses. The CSP license condition requirements can be eliminated after the zirconium fire window is surpassed in August 2022. Holtec indicated it plans to submit a license amendment request (LAR) to remove the condition in early May 2022. New York State plans to review the LAR when submitted.

The interstate gas transmission pipelines in proximity to the Indian Point facilities are covered by separate emergency plans and regulations. Cybersecurity regulations for critical infrastructure, such as pipelines, is overseen by the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  In response to the Colonial pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, the TSA released an initial security directive on May 26, 2021 requiring operators of critical pipelines to report confirmed and potential cybersecurity events to DHS, designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator to be available 24 hours a day, review current practices against TSA security guidelines, identify any gaps, and report results and related remediation measures to DHS with 30 days. 

On July 20, 2021, the TSA issued a second directive to critical pipeline operators requiring operators to implement specific mitigation measures to protect against ransomware attacks and other known threats to technology systems. According to the TSA, the specific mitigation measures are based on guidelines published by the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST).  In addition, the second directive implemented recommendations from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) requiring operators to develop cybersecurity contingency / response plan and perform annual cybersecurity design reviews to test the effectiveness of their cybersecurity practices. 

Enbridge, the company the operates the pipelines, states that it is following both directives and working closely with the TSA.

Cyber-attacks have been documented in gas pipelines before (Colonial Pipeline). This is a very serious consideration. Gov. Hochul put together a special task force because of potential cyber-attacks.
Cybersecurity threats on our national infrastructure are taken seriously and will be considered as a topic for a future DOB meeting.

Are there any monies from elsewhere going to research on river infrastructure resiliency for climate change? For instance, would this be a layer in the Buchanan Cortlandt sewer project?
New York State has a variety of funding programs available for projects to upgrade infrastructure and make communities more resilient to flooding and other impacts of climate-driven severe storms and weather events, including the Water Infrastructure Improvement Act (WIIA), Water Quality Improvement Project (WQIP) Program, and Intermunicipal Grant (IMG) programs.  Details regarding a recent announcement by Governor Hochul can be found at: https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-600-million-grants-available-water-infrastructure-and-resiliency

The Hudson River Estuary program also provides annual grants and technical support for resiliency projects including:

• Help for communities to achieve Climate Smart Communities certification which puts them in a position to compete for NYSDEC Climate Smart Communities grants.   This is a partnership with Cornell Cooperative Extension, which provides technical assistance to 10 communities annually.
• Estuary grants:  A competitive RFA is generally announced in April every year with a maximum grant of $50,000 which supports projects to:
  • Create resilience plans and strategies for waterfront communities along the Hudson River estuary shoreline to adapt to climate change risks like flooding and sea-level rise and potential climate impacts on natural resources and the environment.
  • Develop Engineering Plans/Designs to make water infrastructure more resilient to flooding and/or sea level rise
  • Water Quality Monitoring, Watershed Characterization, and Water Quality Improvement Planning and Design

In addition, The Community Risk and Resiliency Act requires applicants for certain permits or funding programs to demonstrate that future physical climate risk due to sea-level rise, storm surge and flooding have been considered, and that these factors be incorporated into certain facility-siting regulations.  NYSDEC, in consultation with the NYS Department of State, developed New York State Flood Risk Management Guidance for Implementation of the Community Risk and Resiliency Act, which may be found at:

https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/administration_pdf/crrafloodriskmgmtgdnc.pdf.

How can we arrange for a tour of Indian Point?
At the October 27, 2021 DOB meeting, Holtec extended an invitation to those interested in a site visit to contact Richard Burroni, Senior Vice President at Indian Point.